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his thesis is on evaluation of the soundness of the
Reagan administration's policy for transferring arms to the
People's Republic of China, with a sound policy defined as
-• in which the potential benefits outweigh the assessed
risks. The evaluation begins by tracing the policy's
historical development. This is followed by an
investigation into the rationale behind both the United
States' and China's participation in arms transfers with
each other. The policy evaluation is completed with
benefit, cost and risk analyses. The evaluation indicates
that the Reagan administration's arms transfer policy for
China is the result of an evolutionary rather than
. Diutionary development. It should be mutually beneficial
tc the US and the PRC, and is sound since its potential
-.edits outweigh its probable risks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 19 September 1985, the Washington Post reported that:
The Reagan administration is on the verge of the first
government-to-government arms sale to China, including a
(US)$ 6 million package of explosives that could lead to a
(US)$ 98 million munitions factory....
Congressional sources described the sale as a landmark
in what has been a slowly developing military relationship
between the United States and China, and predicted that it
would facilitate other, far more important military sales
to Peking, long under discussion
.
[Ref . l]
The proposed sale of the artillery munitions factory
mentioned above has not been particularly controversial
since the plan does not involve exceptionally sophisticated
technology and the munitions it will produce are not
perceived to be very threatening to most of China's
neighbors. However, one should not underestimate the
importance of this transaction. In fact, one could argue
that this sale carries with it an explosive potential far in
excess of the (US)$ 6 million worth of munitions which are
being sold. This initial sale of United States (US) arms to
the People's Republic of China (PRO marks a watershed in
the continuing evolution of Sino-American relations. Future
US-PRC arms deals are currently being negotiated, including
the TOW anti-tank missile, an avionics upgrade kit for the
Chinese F-8 airplane, and the Mark 46 torpedo.
American 'ecisions <>r, weapons sales to China will send
• t both intentional and unintentional signals regarding US
foreign policy to America's allies and adversaries in Asia
and the rest of the world. [Ref. 2] Additionally, US arms in
China may hinder rather than help the continuing development
and normalization of Sino-Anerican relations. One need only
think back to the Nixon policy for US arms sales to Iran to
recall the inherent dangers of using the transfer of arms as
in instrument of foreign policy. Andrew J. Pierre, in his
comprehensive work on arms transfers, noted that the failure
to consider the full implicatons of the massive US arms
transfers to the Shah of Iran may have contibuted to his
ultimate downfall
.
[Ref . 3] Pierre also points out several
other examples which indicate a US tendency to use arms
sales for immediate gain with Little regard for longer-term
implications of the transf ers
.
[ Ref . l:p. 48]
In spite of these risks, however, the Reagan
administration adopted a policy which currently allows, on a
aase-by-case basis, the transfer of specific weapons and
eapons systems from the United States to China. Even
though the ultimate wisdom of this policy may not be known
far many years, it is my hypothesis that President Reagan
made the right decision and his administration's policy for
selling arms to China is a sound one.
This hypothesis will be submitted to a three part
evaluation. First, as evolutionary policy development is
often an indicator of sound judgement, a determination will
be made on the policy's continuity with regard to earlier
administrations. This will be done in chapter two by
tracing the policy's historical development. Although the
incremental development of a policy cannot stand alone as
evidence that the current one is sound, gross
discontinuities across succeeding administrations normally
signal some sort of policy problem which in itself is of
value for a policy evaluation. The second part of the
hypothesis evaluation will be conducted in chapters three
and four and involves the determination of the rationale
behind the Reagan arms transfer policy for China. The
discussion of rationale will cover both the PRC as the arms
recipient in chapter three and the US as the arms supplier
in chapter four. Each participant's rationale will be
determined by first evaluating the probable validity and/or
priority of its stated reasons for participating in arms
transfers with the other.
Public pronouncements regarding either country's arms
transfer justification have not been accepted at face value
for a number of reasons. In. the first place, public
statements regarding arms transfers are often misleading.
In addition to being overstated for use as a negotiating
gambit, the announced reasons for engaging in an arms
transfer given by either the United States or China may be
aimed at audiences other than the negotiating parties.
Furthermore, since internal political disagreements exist in
both nations, neither can be expected to speak with a single
consistent voice. A third and related problem with
accepting stated rationale is that Chinese motives for
buying, and American motives for selling arms are complex,
inter-related and dynamic. Thus, the relative importance of
any announcement depends upon nuances of timing and relative
priority. Finally, each country's longterm national intent
regarding the other is still being closely held. This is
mostly because the United States and China only recently
renewed normal bilateral relations after close to thirty
years of mutual mistrust and hostility. For these reasons
one must, therefore, look beyond the publicly stated motives
to determine the true rationales for the Sino-American arms
connection.
The evaluation of a stated rationale's probable validity
and/or priority is based on three general assumptions. The
first is that each country will act rationally in its own
best interest. The second is that a country's true arms
transfer motives are normally reflected by its observable
arms transfer behavior. Lastly, certain actions in the
dynamics of arms transfers can normally be predicted for a
given motive. For example, if a country is motivated to
procure arms by an external air threat, then, that country
will normally seek some kind of air defense weapon. Thus,
10
the validity of an arms transfer rationale offered by a
country would be either supported or refuted by its relevant
behavior
.
The first step in evaluating a stated rationale will be
to identify the unconstrained arms transfer actions
associated with that rationale. Next, factors which
constrain the subject's arms transfer actions will be
identified. In step three, the identified constraints will
be applied to predicted unconstrained actions in order to
deduce expected behavior. The actions associated with the
expected behavior are then compared with the subject's
observed actions. The relative consistency between expected
and observed activity may be interpreted in two different
ways. Strong behavioral consistency indicates a strong
probability that an evaluated rationale is valid and has a
high priority. In other words, a high degree of consistency
means that the government in question is actually motivated
by the postulated factors. Significant inconsistencies in
arms transfer behavior reflect that the rationale in
question has either a low probability of being valid since
it is not supported by behavior, or if valid has a low
priority. In either case inconsistent behavior is
indicative of a low probability that the evaluated rationale
is a key factor in the Sino-American arms connection.
11
Analysis of both supplier and recipient rationale is
required in order to determine if the needs of both the
United States and China can be met by the Reagan arms
transfer policy. The policy's potential for meeting each
side's expectations is a further indication of its
soundness. Failure of the policy to meet either minimum US
or PRC demands could be a source of tension, disagreement or
possibly even the disruption of bilateral relations [ Ref
.
3:p. 82], and could on this basis be judged unsound. If the
Reagan administration policy meets or can be reasonably
expected to meet Chinese and American demands, then one has
another indication of the soundness of that policy. While
demand fulfillment may be further indication that a policy
is sound, like incremental development, it cannot stand
alone as evidence on which to base a final judgement. For
this reason, the Reagan arms transfer policy will be
subjected to a third evaluation.
The third and final policy test will be the subject of
chapters five and six. In this test, the Reagan policy will
be subjected to a benefit, cost and risk analysis. The
expected benefits to the US are those derived in chapter
four. The potential negative impact or "costs" of the
policy on Sino-American relations will be developed in
chapter five. The possible negative effects on the
US-PRC-USSR triangular relationship will be the subject of
12
will be computed as a combination of the cost of an adverse
reaction to US arms transfers to China with the probability
of that reaction's occurrence. President Reagan's policy
will be considered sound if policy benefits are even
marginal and the accompanying risks are not prohibitively
high.
In the seventh and final Chapter of this thesis, the
conclusions of the preceeding analysis will be presented.
Additionally, recommendations for improving American arms
transfer policy for China will be offered as warranted.
Before proceeding with the investigation it is necessary
to address several limitations of this work. The analysis
of security implications has been limited to an
investigation of the potential political, military and
economic effects of the US-PRC arms connection. The social
: [r\x r o '.',l- - ffects w - - : risi '.-red somewhat tangential
; rican security interests regarding China and were
omitted to save space and time. Furthermore, the desire to
keep this work unclassified precluded a comprehensive
treatment of the policy's implications for US intelligence.
Thus, intelligence implications have been addressed only
superficially. Additionally, evaluations of specific
benefits, costs and probabilities have been subjectively
assigned as being low, moderate, or high. Due to resource
13
constraints, as well as the recurring problems of dealing
with classified information, no attempt was made to assign
quantative values to these critical elements. Resource
constraints also precluded the analysis of the impact of the
arms transfers on US relations with China's neighbors other
than the Soviet Union. While other regional actors may be
considered important, none of the PRC'S neighbors other than
the Soviet Union is currently likely and capable of reacting
to US arms transfers to China in such a way as to threaten
America's vital interests. Finally, although they are not
exactly synonymous the words motive, motivation, reason, and
rationale have been used interchangably in order to avoid
the overuse of any one of these terms. In the context of
this thesis they have all been used to describe the rational
basis for US and PRC arms transfer behavior.
14
II. EVOLUTION OF THE REAGAN .- ; L I I
In order to fully understand the implications of the
Reagan decision to allow China to receive American arms, it
is necessary to first briefly review the historical
development of that decision. This review will show that
the development of Sino-American arms ties under President
Reagan was the continuation of a policy whose development
spanned four successive administrations.
A. OPENING MOVES UNDER NIXON
Shortly after the Sino-Soviet split had been confirmed
for American analysts by the March 1969 border clashes
between Chinese and Soviet troops, President Nixon initiated
actions toward developing a new relationship between the
United States and the People's Republic of Ir.ina. By late
1 : ~2, ss America was disengaging itself fron Vietna - . US
policy makers began to seriously consider China as a
possible counterweight to Soviet power in Asia. During the
early years of Sino-American ties, President Nixon made
several decisions regarding China which had significant
military implications and therefore tended to underscore the
security aspect of the relationship. These decisions
involved the sale to China of some dual-use (items primarily
of civilian use but with potential military applications)
15
high technology equipment such as a satellite ground station
and some Boeing 707 aircraft
.
[Ref . 4]
B. FORD REFINES THE IDEA
The idea of actually selling American weapons to China,
however, did not surface publicly until the Ford
administration. One of the first analysts to even address
the potential impact of the US transferring arms to China
was Robert E. Klitgaard. In a 1974 Rand study on National
Security and Export Controls
,
Klitgaard noted that,
treating China and Soviet Union in export control policy
as if they posed identical military threats is a mistake.
It is quite possible that exports to either country would
have more effects on Sino-Soviet relations than on
US-Soviet or US-Chinese interactions; that, to be purely
hypothetical, exporting tactical air defense systems to
China might enhance US security overall
.
[Ref . 5]
While it is apparent from this statement that Klitgaard
recognized some potential security benefits of US arms
transfers to China, these transfers were not really the
focus of his study and the idea was, therefore, not well
developed in it. One of the first detailed discussions of
America using arms transfers to and a military relationship
with China for US national security was presented by Michael
Pillsbury in his essay, "U.S. -China Military Ties?" In this
essay which appeared in the Fall 1975 issue of Foreign
Policy, Pillsbury proposed that the United States could use




The subject of military ties to China continued to be
discussed in America throughout the remainder of the Ford
administration. During this same time, the subject of
Sino-American military ties was also being vigorously
debated in the PRC as the Chinese began to look to the West
for modern weapons and equipment with which to improve their
Army. Yet, for reasons which remain moot, but may have been
related to its internal political upheaval, China did not
attempt to purchase any American arms at that time, despite
the apparent willingness of the US to supply the PRC with
weapons .[ Ref . 7] The Ford administration did, however,
approve the British sale to China of Rolls Royce "Spey"
aircraft engines which included US components, as well as
the sale of a dual-use computer
.
[Ref . 4]
C. A BREAKTHROUGH UNDER CARTER
The real breakthrough in the development of a
Sino-American military relationship did not come about until
the Carter administration. The breakthrough was achieved
when President Carter's Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, met
with the top Chinese leadership in Beijing in January
1980. [Ref. 8] This meeting took place one month after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan underlined the strategic
importance of growing Sino-American ties. According to
Richard C. Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, it was during the Brown
17
irst .; f for c :1J ' 1 : '. ;ui . 1 (1
. }' uas presented to L Lna
Initiative. "[Rcf. 9] Secretary Crown also notified the
S!'
-'
: 2sc leadership that the United States was prepared to
liberalize its export controls on dual-use items as well.
These offers were aimed at strengthening Sino-American
security ties in light of what was perceived to be a connon
Let threat. In add i tier, to the US decision to adjust its
export regulations, the Chinese and American officials
- reed tc conduct a strategic dialogue aimed at identifying
u tua 1 interest and t c initiate a v r kj j. d
e;:c anga visits by US an: PUS defense personnel to determine
7here military cooperation might be mutually
; ene£icial.[Ref. 4]
Carter administration decision to allow China to
receive defense equipment was ce:: if"ied in March 1930 when
— ? O w ^ v. . . l . i __ - . 3
:-r SI (hC CI) . In pre- ulgating '.'.'
U J. - • - . . 3 i.icl af f-nr
he People's Republic of China for the first tine te
sse-by-Case (CSC) consideration of items and technology
- 7 7C munitions list. Authorized for possible
approval were a variety of combat support categories,
Including trucks, recovery vehicles, certain
cargo/personnel carrying aircraft and helicopters, some
training equipment, certain communications equipment and
snn'al r*c r i a Cameras. [Ref. 8:p. 142]
Similarly, the decision to liberalize the export to China of
dual-use equipment was codified in April 1980
when the Department of Commerce established a new and
unique category, P, for China under US commodity control
export regulations. The licensing policy for this
category permitted exports at significantly higher
technical levels than for most other Communist
countries
.
[Ref . 8:p. 141]
Based on the agreements reached during Defense Secretary
Brown's 1980 visit to China, one might have concluded that
the United States and China were moving rapidly toward a
tight security relationship. This was not the case,
however, as the leadership in both Washington and Beijing
paused to debate the long-range implications of military
cooperation. Thus, by the end of the Carter presidency, the
limits of US military cooperation with China were apparently
defined by administration spokesmen who noted that, "the
United States and China seek neither a military alliance nor
any joint defense planning, and that the United States does
not sell weapons to China. "[Ref. 10] Yet, even those limits
were to be rather flexible, for Carter spokesmen had also




D. CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT UNDER REAGAN
As a result of the 1980 presidential election, it would
be the Reagan rather than the Carter administration which
effected the most significant change in US arms transfer
19
policy toward China. Yet, change continued to be
evolutionary and came about only after lengthy debate.
Early in his administration, President Reagan attempted to
maintain the momentum of Sino-American defense cooperation
by dispatching Secretary of State Haig to China. [Ref. 8:p.
143] Haig, who arrived in China in June 1981, attempted to
focus his discussions on the development of closer strategic
cooperation between the United States and China against the
Soviet Union. As an apparent incentive for this strategic
cooperation, Secretary Haig announced that the United States
was now prepared to sell lethal military equipment to
China. [Ref. 4:p. 6] This meant that China would be able
"to purchase items on the munitions lists on the same
case-by-case basis as other friendly, nonallied countries.
(added military items and technologies not possible under MC
81)"[Ref. 8:p. 193]
The Chinese response to this American effort was
negative. The Chinese informed the Reagan administration
that they were not interested in American weapons at that
time. Beijing's somewhat surprising disinterest in US arms
transfers was rooted in its dissatisfaction with
Washington's continued sales of weapons to Taiwan. Even
though the US government no longer recognized the government
of the Republic of China on Taiwan, American arms sales to
the island had been continued under provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979. The PRC government considered those
20
sales, as well as the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act
covering them, to be interference in Chinese internal
affairs. Beijing therefore refused to proceed with the
development of Sino-American military relations until that
aspect of the Taiwan issue was resolved.
In the meantime, the debate over the development of a
defense relationship with the PRC continued in the United
States. Administration policies to loosen restrictions on
the export of advanced technology dual-use items and lethal
military equipment to China did not receive concensus
support in Washington. In fact, "in June 1981, Secretary of
State Haig found it necessary to obtain White House support
to direct the bureaucracy to loosen up the restrictions they
were imposing on China. "[Ref. 8:p. 142] Thus, due to both
internal and external obstacles, the development of American
military cooperation with, and arms sales to, China had
stalled .
In order to regain the political initiative, the Reagan
administration took a number of steps to get the
Sino-American security relationship moving again. First,
the Reagan position on relaxed export controls and arms
transfers to China was explained to the Congress. On 16
July 19S1, Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge testified
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that
The steady development of our relations with China over
the last several years, as well as our evolving strategic
cooperation, makes it inappropriate for us to maintain the
21
tight controls on munitions exports to China that we do on
such exports to our adversaries. A flat prohibition on
sales to China, a friendly country, chiefly benefits its
opportunistic and agressive neighbor. The decision is not
a decision to sell any specific weapons systems or
military technology; it will merely enable China to make
requests to purchase from US commercial sources any items
on the US munitions list.[Ref. 11]
Next, the administration tackled the problem of getting the
bureaucracy moving by actually changing US export
regulations. By the end of 1981, new regulations had been
promulgated which removed China from the list of nations
denied munitions exports. By issuing the new regulation
"the policy announced the previous June by Secretary Haig
was institutionalized ."[ Ref . 8:p. 143] Thus, the domestic
arena was being prepared to handle any prospective arms
transfers to China. Yet arms transfers and military
cooperation could still not reasonably be expected until the
issue of US arms sales to Taiwan was resolved to the PRC '
s
satisfaction.
As it turned out, Reagan initiatives were not restricted
to the domestic political front. By the late summer of
1982, the President had taken two critical steps which
overcame the Taiwan obstacle. First, the administration
decided early in the year not to allow the sale of the
Northrop F5G fighter aircraft to Taiwan, which would have
significantly upgraded its air fighting capability. This
decision reflected a growing awareness in Washington of
Beijing's sensitivity to US weapons in Taiwan. Then, in
22
August, the United States reached a compromise position with
China regarding future American arms sales to Taiwan. This
position which was announced on 17 August 1982, in a US-PRC
joint .communique declared that the United States
does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms
sales to Taiwan; that its arms sales to Taiwan will not
exceed, either in qualatitive or quantitative terms, the
level of those supplied in recent years since the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United
States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually
its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time
to a final resolution .[ Ref . 4:p. 7]
This compromise, popularly referred to as the "Shanghai II"
communique, allowed the strategic dialogue between the
United States and China to continue.
The next major breakthrough regarding arms transfers
came from the US Department of Commerce. After a May 1983
trip to China, Commerce Secretary Malcom Baldridge announced
that the US would take further steps toward liberalizing its
position on technology transfer to the PRC.[Ref. 12]
Shortly after his return to the United States, it was
announced that China would be moved from its special "P"
category to the more general "V" group which included
friendly nonaligned countries such as India and
Yugoslavia .[ Ref . 8:p. 142] This announcement, when finally
translated into regulation, was critical to the first real
transfer of militarily capable US equipment to China.
According to Michael Hull, Director for International
Business, United Technologies/Sikorsky Aircraft,
23
The "ice breaker" was a Commerce Department final rule in
November 1983 implementing a more liberal export control
policy toward the PRC. Concerning arms transfers, an
extract from Section 385.4 reads: "Licenses may be
approved even when the end-user or end-use is military.
Commodities or data may be approved for export even though
they may contribute to Chinese military developments"
These two sentences were critical to our future sale for
24 Sikorsky S-70C helicopters (civilian versions of the US
Army UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopter) to the PRC.[Ref.
13]
The bilateral discussion of Sino-American military ties
in general and arms transfers in particular continued
through the remainder of President Reagan's first term. As
his first term drew to a close, there was a pronounced
increase in civilian and military contacts and exchanges,
the most significant of which was President Reagan's own
China visit which took place in April 1984. During that
visit, the President acknowledged in a 27 April speech that
the United States and China faced a historic opportunity for
mutual cooperation .[ Ref . 14]
In a subsequent address delivered on 30 April, President
Reagan also talked about the existence of Chinese and
American mutual interests and remarked that
Your government's policy of forging closer ties in the
free exchange of knowledge.. . . has opened the way to a new
convergence of Chinese and American interests.... Already
there are some political concerns that align us, and there
are some important questions on which we both agree. [Ref.
15]
In closing, President Reagan underscored what is perhaps
the most significant aspect of the future development of
US-PRC ties. In addition to noting the historic opportunity
24
for mutual benefit from such ties, he addressed the critical
element of choice in the development of Sino-American
relations
.
[Ref . 15:p, 4]
On 12 June 1984, President Reagan demonstrated America's
choice of direction regarding future military relations and
arms sales to China. In a memorandum for the Secretary of
State, for subsequent transmittal to the Congress, the
President declared:
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 3(a)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act, I hereby find that the
furnishing of defense articles and defense services to the
Government of China will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace. [Ref. 16]
This finding was required to make the PRC eligible for the
US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The principal
effect of China's FMS eligiblity was that arms transfers
could be handled as commercial sales or as
government-to-government transactions. After somewhat
detailed and lengthy negotiations, China also indicated its
choice of direction and notified the Reagan administration
of its desire to secure some US artillery munitions and
their related technologies through the FMS program.
In reviewing the sequence of events that has taken the
Sino-American arms transfer relationship to its current
stage, it should be apparent that the relationship has been
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Some critics of
current administration policy have argued that the
relationship has developed too rapidly. Yet even these
25
critics must acknowledge that while developments have been
rapid, they have also been incremental and sequential. One
need only recall the separate stages to see the evolutionary
nature of American arms transfers to China. Briefly,
authorization for military sales proceeded as follows:
1. Jun 1971 - 21 year-old general trade embargo lifted
2. Feb 1972 - Case-by-case consideration for the sale of
an extremely limited number of dual-use items, i.e.
Boeing 707s. (Note: the remaining authorizations are on
a case-by-case basis.)
3. Apr 1976 - US approval of allied sale of military
equipment to PRC.
4. Nov 1978 - US approval of allied sale of military
weapons to PRC.
5. Mar 1980 - US offers sale of non-lethal military
equipment under MC 81.
6. Apr 1980 - US expands sale of dual-use equipment with
PRC under code "P".
7. Dec 1981 - US offers sale of lethal military
equipment
.
8. Jun 1983 - US expands sale of dual-use equipment with
PRC under code "V".
9. Jun 1984 - FMS cash sales of lethal military
equipment authorized.
By recognizing its progressive evolution, one might
conclude that the current policy was slowly and carefully
developed and is, therefore, essentially sound. Before
this judgement is rendered, however, a number of other
evaluations should be made. Even though an evolved policy
is often better than a revolutionary one, there is no
guarantee that it will be a sound one. The next
26
evaluation is a determination whether or not the current
US policy meets minimum US and Chinese demands.
27
III. WHY CHINA WANTS US ARMS
A basic explanation sometimes offered for the PRC's
interest in developing military ties, including an arms
transfer relationship, with the US is that "there are very
real commonalities of national interest between the United
States and China. "[Ref. 12:p. 243] Yet, broad-based
parallel, common, or even convergent interests often conceal
a wide range of sub-motives and do little to explain China's
real rationale for procuring US weapons. Understanding the
demand factors behind the PRC's desire to secure American
arms is an essential element in the development,
implementation, and evaluation of the Reagan arms transfer
policy for China.
1
. Counter A Soviet Threat
One of the first explanations that comes to mind for
the development of US arms transfers to the PRC is that both
the United States and China have a mutual interest in
countering the expansion of Soviet power and influence in
Asia. For example, in March 1980 it was reported that
"America's willingness to move ahead with sales of military
equipment to China was seen by the Chinese as a big
28
indication of US commitment to work with China in a common
froni 13a.ir.st the Soviet Union. "[Ref. 10: p. 10]
The presence of over fifty Soviet divisions in Asia
does provide China with both classic and a credible motive
"or seeking US arms. In fact, the "Soviet threat" rationale
has been cited x:y Reagan administration officials in recent
Congressional hearings as the justification, for the PRC's
inclusion in the US Foreign Military Sales ( FMS ) program.
During these hearings it was stated that,
People's Republic of China is a major Asian power that
- p; rallel interests with the United States as a result
of 3 1 ' • j. opposition to Soviet and Soviet proxy
expansionism , especially in Southwest and Southeast Asia.
Its ability to defend itself against a Soviet conventional
military threat, however, is limited by its deficiencies
in equipment. Therefore, the United States has gradually
broadened the scope of defensive equipment and technology
that it would consider for export license to China. [Ref.
There arc, however, opponents of arms sales to China
r ;7 ue hst t hiilai L ;ie boviet cares being overplayed by
the Chinese to gain concessions from the US and it is not
really a significant factor in their desire to receive
2rican arms. There is also general agreement among US
specialists thai China Scv^ not face an immediate crisis in
its current military confrontation with the Soviet
Union. [Ref. 10 :p. 9] Yet, what US analysts perceive as
bain': a threat to China may not be relevant to Chinese
perception.--. However, some analysts argue that the Chinese
themselves do not currently fear a Soviet attach. Richard
Nations reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review, that
sometime around 1981, Peking had downgraded the threat of a
direct attack from the north. This was because the Chinese
saw that Soviet expansionism was bogged down by a number of
internal and external factors and had simply run out of
steam. Furthermore, "by 1985, high level Chinese security
officials privately conceded to visiting Western dignitaries
that they now viewed the fifty divisions of Soviet troops
along their common border as essentially defensive . " [ Ref
.
18]
It should be apparent that there is some doubt about
the relevance of the "Soviet threat," toward China's
acquisition of US weapons. In fact, there are significantly
varying opinions among China watchers regarding the PRC '
s
motives for its pursuit of American armament. One way to
dispel these doubts and evaluate the validity of the "Soviet
threat" as well as many other arms procurement rationale
ascribed to the Chinese, is to compare the arms transfer
actions consistent with a given motivation to the actual
arms transfer actions displayed by the PRC. As was
previously mentioned in the' introduction, the relative
consistency between expected and observed activity provides
an excellent measure of either the validity or priority of a
possible demand factor. The first demand factor to be
evaluated will be countering the threat of a near-term
Soviet attack.
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a. Counter The Threat of A Near-Terra Soviet Attack
If China desires US arms to counter the threat
of a near-term Soviet attack, then it is predicted that an
unconstrained China would:
1. Negotiate rapidly due to the immediacy of the threat.
2. Attempt to make large procurements of major end items
in order to rapidly field sufficient weapons to deter
or defeat the threat.
3. Attempt to procure weapons which would neutralize
Soviet tactical advantages. (e.g. Anti-tank missiles
to neutralize the Soviet advantage in armored forces.)
4. Make political concessions to the United States as
required to speed procurement.
China may currently be constrained by:
1. the lack of sufficient hard currency to purchase
enough equipment to decisively defeat a near-term
Soviet attack. [Ref. 11]
2. the inability to absorb large quantities of
sophisticated US military equipment .[ Ref . 4:p. 10]
2. internal policy differences on spending
priorities .[ Ref . 4.:p. 11]
4. its unwillingness to become dependent on foreign
suppliers .[ Ref . 19]
its uncertainty about what the US expects in return
for the transfer of arms. [Ref. 20]
5.
6. mistrust of US intentions regarding Taiwan. [Ref. 21]
If China desires US arms to counter the threat
of a near-term Soviet attack, then, given current
constraints, China can be expected to:
31
1. emphasize the procurement of weapons over technology.
2. purchase as many weapons as it could afford and
attempt to procure additional armament on credit.
3. procure weapons which neutralize Soviet tactical
advantages
4. make significant political concessions to the US as
required to speed procurement.
Regarding the procurement of US arms, China has:
1. tended to emphasize the procurement of arms technology
rather than the purchase of arms themselves .[ Ref
.
12:p. 278]
2. ordered only a limited number of end items(i.e. 24
Sikorsky S-70C helicopters and 50 F-8 aircraft
avionics upgrade kits)[Ref. 22] and failed to request
FMS credit.
3. emphasized the procurement of weapons designed to
neutralize Soviet tactical advantages .[ Ref . 4:p. 22]
e.g. :
a. Artillery munitions (announced Sept 85) which
correct artillery disadvantages discovered
during the 1979 conflict with Vietnam.
b. F-8 Avionics upgrade kits (announced in April
86) to counter Soviet air superiority.
c. TOW anti-tank missiles (negotiations ongoing) to
counter Soviet armor superiority.
4. Made minor concessions on:
a. Taiwan issue by agreeing to continued limited US
arms sales to Taiwan. [Ref. 4:p. 7]
b. US desires for military ties by:
(1) initially agreeing to an 18 May 1985 US
Naval ship visit to the port of Shanghai,
(subsequently postponed )[ Ref . 23]
(2) conducting symbolic Naval passing
exercise with the US Navy. [Ref. 18:p. 65]
(3) agreeing to government-to-government
procurement of the artillery munitions
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(4)
package under the US FMS program rather
than insisting on purely commercial sales
as in the case of the Sikorsky
helicopters. [Ref. 24]
agreeing to continued limited military
exchange visits between Chinese and US
military personnel .[ Ref . 25]
If China desires to secure US arms to counter
the threat of a near-term Soviet attack, then the following
actions require further explanation:
1. China's continued reluctance to make any major
concessions such as:
a. agreeing to closer military ties such as an
alliance or definite alignment with the US in
return for higher technology weapons or US
military assistance to deter the threat.
b. renouncing the use of force for the settlement
of the Taiwan issue in return for either
concessionary terms or higher technology
weapons
.
2. China's failure to attempt to procure US weapons with
FMS credit.
The difference between China's expected and
observed actions may be due to:
1. China's belief that the mere existence of a Sino-
American arms connection is sufficient to deter a
near-term Soviet attack. If this is true, then the
PRC would have little reason to make concessions to
the US.
2. China's belief that US FMS credit for arms purchases
is currently unavailable due to American fiscal
constraints .
Due to the significant inconsistency between its
expected and observed arms transfer activity, we may
conclude that countering a near-term Soviet attack is
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probably not a strong PRC motive for securing US arms. The
most striking inconsistency was China's failure to make any
significant concessions to the US in order to speed the
delivery of weapons. Moreover, it is doubtful that the PRC
would depend on a symbolic tie to deter a real attack.
b. Counter The Threat Of Long-Term Soviet Expansion
If China desires US arms to counter the threat
of long-term Soviet expansion, then an unconstrained China
would
:
1. make minimum concessions in arms transfer negotiations
with the US as the threat is not immediate.
2. procure weapons with state-of-the-art technology in
order to decrease the qualitative advantage of the
USSR and counter a future Soviet military threat.
3. emphasize the procurement of weapons technology rather
than end items as an indigenous weapons production
capability provides greater security against a
long-term threat.
China may currently be constrained by*.
1. US limits on the types of weapons it is willing to
transfer to China. The PRC is currently limited to
receiving weapons which have been determined to be
primarily defensive in nature. [Ref. 26]
2. US limits on the levels of technology it is willing to
transfer to China. [Ref. 27]
3. its inability to absorb state-of-the-art technology.
4. the lack of sufficient hard currency to purchase
state-of-the-art weapons and technology which are
normally quite expensive.
5. its unwillingness to expand military ties with the




If China desires US arms to counter the
long-term threat of Soviet expansion, then, given current
constraints, China can be expected to:
1. make minimum concessions to the US as the threat from
the Soviet Union is not immediate. The unwillingness
to make concessions normally leads to lengthy
negotiations
.
2. procure the minimum number of weapons required by the
US in order to get their associated production
technologies
3. emphasize the procurement of technology as opposed to
end items.
4. procure the highest level of technology offered by the




Regarding the procurement of US arms, China has:
engaged in lengthy negotiations and made few
concessions .[ Ref . 28]
made relatively small purchases of US equipment.
While it is true that the Chinese have been
negotiating for the highest technological level of
weapons currently authorized by the US, such as the
Improved-TOW (I -TOW) anti-tank missile and the MK 46
torpedo, [ Ref . 29] it has been rumored that the long
delay in finalizing an agreement on the transfer of
the TOW system is the Chinese desire for the latest
model of the weapon.
emphasized the procurement of technology as opposed to
end items.
attempted to include production technologies in its
weapons purchases as evidenced by:
a. the artillery munitions plant deal which will
provide the PRC the technology necessary to
manufacture US designed artillery munitions.
b. negotiations for the TOW anti-tank missile which




Based on the absence of varience between China's
expected and observed arms transfer actions, one may
conclude that there is a strong probability that the PRC is
strongly motivated to secure US weapons by the threat of
long-term Soviet expansion.
2 . Improve Military Capability
A third explanation for China wanting American arms
is the PRC's desire to improve its military capability. For
a variety of reasons, this motivation may also be
independent of any perceptions of the "Soviet threat."
First, a strong and modern military force may be
symbolically important to the pragmatic Chinese leadership
as it attempts to initiate a number of political, economic
and social reforms. Furthermore, the Deng regime may be
procuring US weapons for the PLA as a reward for its
political loyalty .[ Ref . 25:p. 60] The acquisition of
foreign armament may also be tied to the lessons the PLA
learned from its 1979 conflict with Vietnam. In this
regard, the People's Liberation Army may desire modern
weapons "to be able to engage in more limited conflict in
the war zone between nuclear and a mass People's War. "[Ref.
3:p. 226]
In any event, it is clear from other PLA activity
such as its personnel reorganization, changes in military
region boundaries, and the retirement of much of its older
leadership, that China recognizes its need to improve its
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conventional military capability. It is also clear that the
procurement of modern weapons and equipment will play an
important role in upgrading China's military forces.
However, the weight one should assign this particular
motivation in the overall scheme of Sino-American arms
transfers is not quite so clear. Therefore, in order to
determine the relative importance of China's desire to use
US arms to improve its military capability, the next
evaluation will focus on that demand factor.
If China desires US arms to improve its conventional
military capability, then it is predicted that an
unconstrained China would:
1. attempt to procure weapons which would correct its
noted deficiencies such as anti-tank missile systems,
anti-aircraft missile systems, and command and control
communications systems.
2. agree to US proposals to integrate arms transfers into
a broader military relationship in order to gain
exposure to American doctrine, tactics, and training.
3. give the PLA primary control of arms transfers from
the US since the PLA should know best what it needs to
improve its capability.
4. speed procurement in order to initiate training on the
imported armament as soon as possible.
As previously mentioned, China may currently be
constrained by:
1. the lack of funds and absorption capability.
2. US-imposed limitations.
3. internal policy differences on spending priorities or
expanding ties with the US.
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If China desires US arms to improve its conventional
military capability, then, given current constraints, China
can be expected to:
1. attempt to secure US weapons which would remedy noted
PLA deficiencies.
2. compromise with the US on the development of military
ties
.
3. give the PLA a leading role in arms transfers.
4. attempt to quickly secure at least a small number of a
variety of systems in order to establish a training
base which could be expanded in the future.
5. attempt to procure production technologies together
with finished products in order to simultaneously
improve its military production capability with its
military forces capability.
Regarding the procurement of US arms, China has:
1. negotiated to procure weapons which would correct some
of its noted military deficiencies. The PRC has
apparently gone after those items which cover areas
considered by the PLA to be particularly
vulnerable. [Ref. 30]
2. made some compromises on expanding its military ties
with the US. This has been demonstrated by the
continuing exchange of visiting military delegations.
The most recent was the May 1986 reciprocal visit of
PLA Chief of Staff Yang De Zhi in return for the 1985
visit of then US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Vessey. Additionally, the subject of a US
Naval ship visit to a PRC port has been
resurrected .[ Ref . 22]
3. given the Foreign Ministry more influence than the PLA





4. actually procured little military equipment from the
US to date. The only equipment actually delivered




5. negotiated for weapons production technology as well
as end items.
If China desires to secure US arms to improve its
military capability, then the following actions require
further explanation:
1. not giving the PLA the leading role in weapons and
technology transfer. Giving the Foreign Ministry more
influence than the PLA in the areas of weapons and
technology transfer is a strong indication that the
needs of the military are not a strong motive for
securing US arms.
2. not actually procuring a significant number of weapons
after five years of negotiations. The limited
procurement of weapons is further indication that the
needs of the military are not a strong motive for
securing US arms.
The difference between China's expected and observed
actions may,
1. in the case of the PLA not playing the leading role in
arms transfers, be due to:
a. the PLA's lack of experience in negotiating with
foreigners
.
b. greater political reliability in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs than the PLA.
c. internal turmoil within the PLA due to its
reorganization.
2. in the case of the limited actual weapons procurement,
be due to:
a. bureaucratic delays in the PRC and the US.
b. unwillingness of the US to provide the weaponry
the PLA desires.
There are two major inconsistencies between the
expected and the observed actions. These involve the role
of the PLA in arms transfers and the lack of actual weapons
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procurement. The proposed explanation for the PLA having
less than a leading role in arms transfers, if the motive is
to improve China's military capability, is questionable at
best. In the first place, the PLA has had experience
negotiating with the US from the Korean Conflict.
Furthermore, the PLA is normally left in charge of
negotiations for its indigenously produced arms. Secondly,
some of Deng Xiaoping's strongest supporters during his
return to power were in the PLA. While the Deng regime may
have mistrusted some of the Army leadership, it is unlikely
that there were no politically reliable military personnel
who could play a leading role in arms transfers. Finally,
the recent PLA reorganization does not explain why it did
not play a greater role in arms transfers prior to the
personnel turnover.
The case for the lack of weapons procurement is
somewhat stronger. There is little doubt that bureaucratic
delays can add up to years. However, it is still reasonable
to expect a better procurement performance on the part of
the PRC if improving the military was truly a priority.
The inconsistency between the expected and observed
actions indicates that improving the military is probably
not a strong motive for China's procurement of US arms.
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Another general demand factor which may motivate
China's acquisition of American arms may be to gain
political influence. Like the rationale of countering an
external threat, the concept of gaining political influence
must be further refined before it can be properly evaluated.
The Deng regime may be using the Sino-American arms
connection for internal leverage, external leverage or both.
Additionally, if the arms transfers are being pursued by the
PRC for external influence, the target may be the Soviet
Union rather than the United States. Thus, to understand
how the desire for political influence and leverage is
factored into the recipient demand equation, it will be
evaluated next
.
a. Gain Political Leverage Over The Soviet Union
If China desires US arms to gain political
leverage over the Soviet Union, then it is predicted that an
unconstrained China would:
1. Attempt to derive maximum leverage from its arms
connection from the US and use the connection to gain
concessions from the USSR. As concessions were gained
from the Soviets, the Chinese could then be expected
to downplay Sino-American arms transfers.
2. Attempt to procure those American systems presenting
the greatest threat to the USSR in order to exert the
greatest possible leverage over the Soviet Union.
3. Integrate arms transfers with other Sino-American
military ties in order to exert maximum leverage over
the USSR.
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4. Conduct lengthy negotiations in order to have the
greatest amount of flexibility in gaining leverage
over the Soviet Union. Lengthy negotiations could
serve the Chinese in a number of ways:
a. First, the Chinese could keep the Soviets
concerned about the breadth and depth of the
Sino-American relationship by avoiding quick
transactions
.
b. Secondly, lengtxhy negotiations could allow the
PRC to gain substantial bargaining leverage over
the USSR without making significant commitments
or concessions to the US.
c. Finally, lengthy negotiations could provide the
PRC with the time and flexibility required to
play the US and the USSR off against each other.
China may currently be constrained by:
1. the unwillingness of the Beijing leadership to accept
broader military ties with the US which has already
been discussed.
2. the fear of a Soviet overreaction . Although it
appears that the PRC does not fear an imminent threat
from the USSR, it is doubtful that it would take
overly aggressive arms transfer actions and invite a
Soviet attack. [Ref. 32]
3. a potentially adverse US reaction to being played off
against the USSR. [Ref. 33]
If China desires US arms to gain political
leverage over the USSR, then, given current constraints,
China can be expected to:
1. downplay its American arms connection as it gains
concessions from the USSR while keeping that
connection open.
2. attempt to procure those weapons which would cause the
Soviets concern but not alarm. This is because the
arms transfers are meant to bring the Soviets to the
bargaining table not the battlefield.
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3. lip.it the integration of arms transfers with
Sino-American military ties. Limitations would be
placed on the overall military relationship between
the United States and China in order to prevent a
Soviet overreaction which the US could not be counted
on to respond to.
Regarding the procurement of US arms, China has:
1. downplayed its American arms connection as evidenced
by the low-key treatment it gave to American arms
industry representatives during their November 1985
visit to Beijing. [Ref . 34]
2. not attempted to procure the kind of offensive weapons
which would truly alarm the Soviets. It should be
remembered, however, that the US has placed strict
limits on the types of weapons it is willing to
transfer to China.
3. limited the integration of arms transfers with
Sino-American military ties. While the PRC has made
compromises with the US on the expansion of military
ties, these ties have not developed rapidly.
Additionally, both the US and the PRC have been quick
to point out that their military relationship is part
of normalization and is not directed at any third
parties
.
[ Ref . 35
]
Due to the strong consistency between the PRC '
s
observed and expected actions, we may conclude that gaining
political leverage over the Soviet Union is probably a
Chinese motive for securing US arms.
b. Gain Political Leverage Over the United States
If China desires US arms to gain political
leverage over the United States, then it is predicted that
an unconstrained China would:
1. attempt to use arms transfer negotiations to gain
concessions form the US regarding other issues. (e.g.
US arms sales to Taiwan, the textile trade, the
transfer of nuclear power generation equipment.)
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2. negotiate on a wide variety of arms to increase its
access to American military and business leaders.
3. accept less than state-of-the-art equipment in order
to maximize political benefits even at the sacrifice
of military capability.
4. integrate arms transfers with other Sino-American
military ties in order to broaden its access and
leverage base in the US.
China may currently be constrained by:
1 the unwillingness of the Beijing leadership to accept
broader military ties.
2 concern for overreaction on the part of the Soviet
Union.
3. concern for adverse American reactions.
If China desires US arms to gain political
leverage over the United States, then, given current
constraints, China can be expected to:
1. attempt to use arms transfers negotiations to gain
concessions from the US over other issues.
2. negotiate over a wide variety of arms to increase its
access and leverage base in the US.
3. accept less than state-of-the-art equipment in return
for political benefits.
Regarding the procurement of US arms, China has
1. linked its arms transfers with the US to only one
otherissue, that being US arms sales to Taiwan.
Besides this, there has been no evidence of the PRC
linking Sino-American arms transfers and other issues
2. negotiated only on a selected number of items which
has tended to limit PRC contact with US military and
business leaders involved in arms transfers.
3. continued to negotiate for state-of-the-art equipment.
China's acceptance of less than state-of-the-art
equipment appears to result from US imposed limits and
PRC economic constraints rather than a Chinese desire
to be accomodating.
If China desires to secure US arms to gain
political leverage over the United States, then the
following action requires further explanation:
1. The relative absence of political linkage to arms
transfers
.
2. The limited scope of the arms transfer negotiations.
3. The PRC's continued negotiations for state-of-the-art-
equipment in which it has shown relatively little
willingness to compromise its military and
technological desires for political gains.
The difference between China's expected and
observed actions may be explained as follows:
1. The linking of arms transfers to other issues has been
avoided by the PRC for fear of causing the US to
cancel negotiations.
2. Negotiating on only a limited number of items has been
due to a lack of PRC negotiators.
There is little consistency between observed and
expected actions in this case. Additionally, the proposed
explanations for the existing variance are weak at best.
The PRC has seldom hesitated to use military and economic
negotiations for political gains if the desire for those
political gains was strong enough. Furthermore, it is
doubtful that the PRC lacks the skilled negotiators required
to expand its arms transfers discussions with the US. Thus,
the relatively strong inconsistency between its expected and
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observed arms transfer actions in this case leads one to
conclude that the probability is high that gaining political
leverage over the United States is not a priority PRC motive
for securing arms.
c. Gain Internal Political Support
If the Deng regime desires US arms to gain
internal political support, then it is predicted that an
unconstrained Deng regime would:
1. Involve a number of different political factions in
arms transfers in order to give each faction a vested
interest in US arms transfers.
2. use imported US arms and arms related technology to
reward loyal military, industrial, and other
supporters. Receiving control of imported arms and
technology is considered a reward because it normally
carries with it a good amount of prestige, travel and
profit. Furthermore, being in control of the further
distribution of modern weapons and technology allows
one to reinforce his own power base.
3. secure as much US military equipment and weapons
technology as possible to reward supporting factions.
4. integrate arms transfers with other Sino-American
military ties to solidify the support of those PLA and
other Chinese leaders who favor such ties.
The Deng regime may currently be constrained by:
1. the factions which oppose the Sino-American arms
connection
.
2. the unwillingness of uncommitted factions to be bought
off with US arms and technology.
3. the lack of sufficient hard currency to purchase
enough military equipment or technology to satisfy
factional demands.
4. its own unwillingness to accept broader military ties
with the United States.
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If the Deng regime desires US arms to gain
internal political support, then, given current constraints,
the Deng regime can be expected to:
1. involve those political factions that wish to
participate, in US arms transfers.
2. use the limited amount of imported US arms and related
technology to first win uncommitted factions and then,
if available, reward loyal factions.
3. prioritize arms procurement according to internal
political demands.
Regarding the procurement of US arms, it remains
unclear how arms transfers have been affected by internal
PRC politics. While it has been asserted that "US arms
sales were judged to help Deng and the pragmatists in their
continuing arguments with more radical opponents in the
Chinese leadership, "[Ref . 4:p. 5] the actual behavior of
Chinese factions regarding US arms transfers has not been,
nor is it likely to be, publicly reported. Because of the
present inability to link internal PRC political demands
regarding US arms transfers with China's arms transfer
behavior, this demand factor cannot be evaluated.
C. ECONOMIC DEMAND FACTORS
A final demand factor which may motivate China's
acquisition of "US arms is primarily economic in nature.
This is the transfer of the technology embodied in the
design and production of American arms. Chinese insistence
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on technology transfers as an integral part of trade is well
documented in past as well as recent Sino-American
exchanges. For example, Kim Woodard, President of China
Energy Ventures, recently noted during a House Foreign
Affairs Committee hearing on US-China relations that China
has historically sought the indigenization of Western
industrial technology and wants manufacturing technology and
not endless plant and equipment imports .[ Ref . 36]
Furthermore, the PRC leadership has openly stated that it is
more interested in acquiring the technology for China to
produce its own weapons than in buying arms from a foreign
supplier .[ Ref . 37] This may be because "the United States
could certainly help China to overcome the technological gap
that has kept its newest weapons 20 years behind the
s tate-of -the-art . [ Ref . 21:p. 277] Yet, while it may be
clear that the desire to get American technology is one of
its arms transfer motives, it remains to be seen how much of
a priority this particular motive receives.
If China desires US arms to gain access to American
technology, then it is predicted that an unconstrained China
would
:
1. focus on the acquisition of military technology rather
the procurement of end items.




3. give either the Commission in Charge of Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense (CCSTIND)
or the State Scientific and Technological Commission
(SSTC) a leading role in arms transfers.
4. attempt to acquire state-of-the-art military
technology.
5. attempt to separate arms and technology transfers from
other military ties in order to keep negotiations
focused on the hard technological rather than softer
military issues such as exchanges and exercises.
China may currently be constrained by:
1. the lack of sufficient hard currency.
2. the inability of the Chinese military industrial
system to absorb US state-of-the-art technology.
3. the US unwillingness to transfer its state-of-the-art
technology.
4. the unwillingness of US businesses to sell only
technology. [Ref. 29:p. 18]
5. the US desires for a more broadly based military
relationship than just the transfer of military
technology.
If China desires US arms to gain access to American
technology, then, given current constraints, China can be
expected to:
1. focus on the acquisition of military technology rather
txhan end items.
2. attempt to secure military technology with civilian
applications
.
3. give either the CCSTIND or the SSTC a leading role in
arms transfers.
4. attempt to acquire absorbable technology.
5. minimize other military ties with the US and separate
them from arms transfers.
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Rc^ardinp the procurement of US arms. China has:
1. focused on the acquisition of military technology
rather than end items.
2. attempted to identify civilian uses for acquired
military technology .[ Ref . 25]
3. heavily involved the CCSTIKD in arms transfers.
However, the greatest influence is still retained by
the Foreign Ministry.
4. attempted to acquire absorbable technology.
5. attempted to minimize other military ties with the US.
The only significant variance is the fact that the
Foreign Ministry has more influence in arms transfers than
either the Commission in Charge of Science, Technology and
Industry for National Defense or the State Scientific and
Technological Commission. The fact that the Foreign
Ministry has more influence in arms transfers than either
the CCSTIND or the SSTC may be due to a lack of either
negotiating expertise in either commission. However, this
is unlikely as personnel from the both organizations have
been very active in PRC arms transfer negotiation.
The high level of consistency between the PRC's observed
and expected actions indicates that there is a high
probability that gaining access to American technology is a
Chinese motive for securing US arms.
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D. RESULTS OF THE RECIPIENT DEMAND ANALYSIS
The results of the analysis of the demand factors behind
China's participation in arms transfers with the United
States are included in Table 1. These results indicate
that
:
1. China has multiple motives for securing US arms.
2. the primary Chinese motive for securing US arms is to
counter the threat of long-term Soviet expansion.
3. PRC motives of gaining access to American technology
and improving its military capability are also quite
strong.
4. China is not seeking US arms to either counter a
near-term Soviet attack or to exert political leverage
over the United States.
5. The impact of internal politics on China's arms
transfers is currently indeterminable and requires
further investigation.
The capability of the Reagan administration's arms
transfer policy for China to meet PRC demands can now be
determined since those demands should now be reasonably
clear. Based on the preceding evaluation of PRC motives,
there are no real Chinese demands which cannot be met by the
Reagan policy. The administration's policy is flexible
enough to provide the PRC with the arms and technology it
desires not only to counter a long term Soviet threat but
also to meet its internal needs of improving both its
military and its civilian production capabilities. The
types of weapons and technologies, such as TOW anti-tank
missiles and F-8 avionics kits, which have been approved for
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release to the PRC can significantly improve China's
capability to defend itself against a future Soviet attack.
Furthermore, the technology related to the weapons systems
under negotiation should provide a boost to China's
scientific and technological development. Finally, even
though it is doubtful that the United States would release
state-of-the-art technology to the PRC, the Reagan
administration policy does not preclude such a release.
This feature of the Reagan policy, therefore, provides the
United States the flexibility to deal with future as well as
current Chinese demands.
While the capability to meet recipient needs is a
critical element in any arms transfer policy, this
capability addresses only one-half of the transfer. In
fact, since the United States is the party that will be
providing the arms, the supplier rationale should be the
principal concern of administration policymakers. In the
chapter which follows, the rationale behind the willingness
of the United States to transfer arms to China is examined.
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IV. US RATIONALE FOR SUPPLYING ARMS TO CHINA
Our goal is to define a policy on arms sales and
technology transfer which is in our strategic interests--a
policy which should deter and check further Soviet
expansionism and in addition, further the interests of
peace and stability in the region as well as
globally. [Ref. 38]
In these remarks, the Honorable Stephen J. Solars,
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs, identified two fundamental rationales for US arms
transfers to China. Congressman Solars' remarks also
indicate that he believes a US arms transfer policy for
China should be in America's strategic interest. One might
assume that the Reagan administration's current policy for
transferring arms to China meets the Solars criteria since
it has survived the American political process inlcuding a
Congressional review. Based on this assumption one might
also conclude that the basic US rationale for arms transfers
to the PRC is to support American strategic interests.
Yet, these conclusions may not be valid, as the
administration's arms transfer policy for China could have
been primarily the result of bureaucratic and/or political
behavior, rather than rational actions as this thesis
assumes. In order to determine what is truly motivating
American willingness to transfer arms to China, US arms
transfer behavior toward the PRC will be examined.
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To understand the link between American arms transfers
to China and US national interests, it is first necessary to
determine what the Reagan administration defines as US
strategic interests regarding the PRC. After identifying
American strategic interests in China, it is then possible
to determine the role that arms transfers are designed to
play in their support. Finally, by analyzing America's arms
transfer behavior, one can determine not only the validity
but also the strength of US national interests as a
rationale for the Sino-American arms connection.
One can identify the Reagan administration's perceptions
of America's strategic interests in China by carefully
examining a number of recent State and Defense Department
policy statements. In his Fiscal Year (FY) 1936 Annual
Report To The Congress
,
Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger noted that "America's paramount national
interests are peace, freedom and prosperity for ourselves
and others around the world. "[Ref. 39] He also stated that,
America's most basic national security objective is to
preserve the United States as a free nation, at peace,
with its fundamental institutions and values intact. From
this objective flow supporting objectives for which a
defense strategy and military programs must be
formulated. [Ref. 40]
Among the supporting objectives he listed were:
Maintain close and productive relations with our allies
and friends abroad and work closely with them to build and
maintain regional stability in areas of shared mutual
interests.
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Inhi- Lt the expansion of Soviet control and military
presence through the world.
Protect US economic interests worldwide by maintaining
steady access to energy supplies, other critical
resources, and foreign markets . [Ref. 39: p. 25]
These broad interests were then geographically narrowed
as later in his report Secretary Weinberger remarked that,
'/.erica is a Pacific power .vith vital security and economic
Interests in Hast Asia. [Ref. 39:p. 31] Specific American
i : „ ,
,
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ials for China were addressed during !!ou o w L Ul a i ;- n
.rittee hearings on "unit; ta -China
mictions" held in June 193-;. During those hearings,
Assistant Secretary of State Paul Uolfowitz testified that a
-.ice far goal of the Reagan administration has been to put
Sine-American relations on a more stable and comprehensive
i .[Ref. 40] The development o f a Sino-American defense
relationship was also addressed during the hearings. James
'oily. Deputy \ssistant Secretary of Defense for fast Asia
: the Pacific testified that the interaction between
;inisteries is a normal part of relations between
friendly states. He added that the US government intends to
: st blish such interaction with the PRC's hinistcry of
Defense as part of the normalization proces s
.
[ Ref . 41] The
...ore specific role of arms transfers in supporting these US
interests mare addressed by Michael Armacost, the Under
tary of State for Political Affairs. Armacost noted
t recent events have spurred the evolution of some
-* .*-*
-)' ~>
Sino-American cooperation in the field of defense and that
the US was exploring ways of assisting China's upgrading of
its anti-armor j air defense, and anti-submarine warfare
capabilities
. [Ref. 42]
Thus, according to the Reagan administration, arms
transfers, as an aspect of defense cooperation, are a part
of the ongoing normalization of relations between the United
States and China. This normalization process is in turn
supportive of US regional and global interests.
From the preceding discussion, the linkage between US
arms sales to China and America's national interests should
be apparent. If successfully planned and implemented, US
arms transfers to the PRC should have a positive impact on
American regional and global security objectives. However,
even if it is rationally based, it is doubtful that every
security goal or objective can be met by this one policy.
This is because arms transfers are but one small part of the
overall bilateral relationship between the United States and
China. Arms transfer policy is also a result of both
internal and external pressures which result in policy
compromises. A thorough understanding of the US rationale
behind its desire to transfer arms to China will allow those
American officials tasked with the execution of the policy
to prioritize their objectives and then make compromises as
needed. An understanding of America's rationale as the arms
supplier can be achieved by evaluating US motives using the
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same methodology developed in chapter three. The evolution
of America's rationale will be subdivided into three parts.
Part one will be an evaluation of military motives. This
will be followed by the investigation of political
rationales. Finally, there will be a discussion of the
economic motivaion behind America's desire to sell arms to
China
.
A. SUPPLIER MILITARY RATIONALE
One general rationale for arms transfers to China was
offeree by Defense Secretary Ueingerger in his remarks on
the US Security Assistance Program. This program, through
which most American arms transfers are conducted, is
supposed to advance the goals of collective security and
regional stability around the world. In the case of US arms
transfers to China, Edward Ross, a China specialist in the
Department of Defense, noted that the US desires to build an
enduring military relationship with the PRC which will help
maintain China as a force for peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific Region and the world. [Ref. 43]
US arms transfers to China can be expected to enhance
the collective security of America's friends and allies in a
number of ways. First, with the PRC no longer regarded as
an adversary, the United States would not, for the near
term, have the requirement to structure its forces to meet
the "Chinese threat." This would free up planning and
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exercise time for US military forces to prepare for other
contingencies. A second benefit from a friendly military
relationship with China would be that such a relationship
would deter Soviet aggression against the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) because of Soviet desires to
avoid a two-front conf lict
.
[ Ref . 44] An additional benefit
of a US-China military relationship which could develop is
the securing of China's active participation in a regional
security system for Asia. China's cooperation in even an
informal security arrangement with the United States could
not only deter Soviet aggressiveness but also allay the
fears that other Asian nations have historically had of
Chinese expansionism.
Yet, while it is reasonable to conclude that American
arms transfers to China will lead to an expanded military
relationship, one cannot assume that such a relationship
would automatically include regional military cooperation.
In fact, it is rather unlikely that China would actively
participate with the US in a regional system given its bad
experience with the Soviets as an ally, its post World War
Two animosity toward the United States, and its intense
desire to maintain an independent foreign policy.
Furthermore, even if arms transfers should ultimately lead
to formal US-PRC military cooperation, there would be no
guarantee of wartime cooperation between the United States
and China. History is full of examples of broken treaties
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and shifting alignments and it is only when a security
arrangement continues to be in the best interest of the
participants that it can be counted on.
However, even in the absence of strong US-PRC military
ties, one can argue that technologically improved Chinese
forces serve to complicate Soviet strategic planning and
therefore deter Soviet aggressiveness .[ Ref . 45] While the
US cannot absolutely count on Chinese support in the event
of a major East-West conflict, neither can the Soviet Union
absolutely rely on the Chinese to remain uninvolved. Thus,
even though the Soviet forces arrayed against the Chinese
were built up independently of Warsaw Pact requirements [ Ref
.
45:pp. 267-268], the "Chinese threat" prevents their
reassignment to the Western European front for commitment
against NATO. Therefore, US arms transfers might help to
keep the fifty plus Soviet divisions currently deployed
along the Russo-Chinese border fixed in place by helping the
Chinese armed forces maintain themselves as a credible
threat to the Soviet Union. Similarly, Soviet plans for
expansion in Asia must take into account potential Chinese
counteractions. Notwithstanding latent fears by some of the
PRC's neighbors, a strong and secure China can provide both
real and psychological support for Asian countries that
might otherwise succumb to the military pressure of the
Soviet Union or one of its proxies .[ Ref . 46] This is not to
say that the Soviet Union will not try to take advantage of
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r 3 si dual Eears of China on the part of some of her
neighbors. However, Soviet actions in this r?-3rc' will b
Lscussed in chapter six. What i : ; to bo evaluated ;:o:: is
t ic relative strength of this particular American motive for
supplying US arms to China.
illectiv : e c u r i t v
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to enhance
he collective security c? its friends and allies, then it
s predicted that an unconstrained US would:
1. offer arris of a type, quantity and quality which would
t only provide for defense against a Soviet attack
but also threaten the eastern flank of the USSR.
2. coordinate its PRC arm
allies.
transfers with its friends and
integrate the arms transfers into a broader
Sino-American military relationship and attempt to
pain the PRC's cooperation in a regional security
• rrsngperent
.
2 that the arms transfers to the PRC are
directed y;ai
transfer the arm:
US - z" cur~cnti" 7 be constrained bv
:
PRC reluctance to expand Sino-Anerican military
ties.[Ref. 4:d. 11]
. i e r i c a n
to any st'
' 7l
• r\ — o rz f i r» support for Taiwan which is opposed
i e n i n
;
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..oncers about a negative reaction rrom trie Ubbi' wmen
has already warned the US not to sell arms to
concern about negative reactions fro;:. China's ether
s.sian neighbors woo have already expressed misgivings
toward US arms transfers to the PRC.[Ref. 2]
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5. the requirement Cor the approval of its COCO'' partners
which may preclude the transfer of weapons which would
really make China a viable threat to the Soviet
Union. [Ref. 43]
6. domestic fiscal constraints which could preclude not
only giving the arms as aid but also the extension of
credit to the Chinese for the purchase of the
arms. [Ref. 49]
7. doubts about China's long term political
stability. [Ref . 50]
C. China's inability to absorb weapons which could make
it a viable threat to the Soviet Union. [Ref. 10:p. 11]
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to enhance
the collective security of its friends and allies, then
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USSR concern but not alarm. The
uld be to fix in place the fifty
currently deployed in Asia,
eir commitment not only against







n the world. By raising the cost o:
lina, the weapons could also
and security of the region by
conventional deterrence.
:oordinate arms transfers to the PRC wil
nd allies to prevent any adverse reaction
'isrupt the stability of Asia.
its inencs
hich could
attempt to integrate arms transfers into a broader
Sino-American military relationship. A broader
relationship would send a clear signal to potential
enemies of the United States and/or China, as well as
serve as a leavening influence on the Chinese
military .
emphasize that the arms are defensive in nature and
are being provided to the PRC to counter the threat of
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Soviet Expansionism. This would be done to prevent a
radical reaction by the USSR or any of China's other
nei ghbors
.
5. help China finance its arr,s purchases by offering
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit.
.
Regardin; rms transfers to China, the US has
offered the PRC weapons 'which arc primarily defensive
in nature which should raise its deterrence level
without being unduly threatening to the USSR.
Furthermore, while they are qualitatively less than
state-of-the-art, they will increase current PLA
capability. Also, the question of quantity has been
covered by allowing the PRC to produce some of the
items in question under license. [Ref. 4:p. 10]
coordinated arms transfers to the P"C with both its
NATO and its Asian friends and allies. NATO
coordination has been handled through C0C0M[Ref. 51]
while non-NATO coordination has been done on a
bilateral basis. [Ref. 40]




emphasized that the arms were being transferred to
promote the overall peace and stability of the
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o a combination of domestic fiscal constraints and a
ement that the PRC has not offered enough in return for
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Based ov. the stron- positive - correlation between
expected and observed US arms transfer activity in this
case, we may conclude that the desire tc enhance collective
security lias a high probability of being a priority American
motive for transferring arms to China.
2. Gain Strategic Access
<-'
r r*,-, P,Another reason cited by the Secretary of i;erense roi
US security assistance and arns transfers is that they
improve America's "power projection and forward defense
capabilities through access to overseas facilities and
retention of base rights abroad ."[ Ref . 39:p. 271] The
Dayoff for the US of trading arms for access with China
could be quite substantial. If the US had the option of
using Chinese facilities in the event of a major
confrontation with the USSR, it could place Soviet Central
Lan and Soviet Far Eastern forces under considerably
greater pressure than at present .[ Ref . 10:pp. 7-8] One
might wonder if America can realistically expect to get
access to military facilities from a China which has
traditionally and jealously guarded its sovereignty. Yet,
recent revelations of the existence in China of a joint
Sino-American intelligence collection facility indicates
that facilities access is not out of the question for US
policymakers .[ Ref . 54] While gaining access to Chinese
64
military facilities appears to be both desirable and
possible, it remains to be seen if it is in fact a policy
motive .
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to gain
access to PRC military facilities, then it is predicted that
an unconstrained US would:
1. offer China arms for basing rights.
2. offer arms as aid.
3. transfer state-of-the-art weapons if they were desired
by the PRC.
4. relax its internal restrictions against the transfer
of offensive weapons. Selected offensive weapons
might be transferred to the PRC if the benefits of
gaining access to Chinese bases was assessed to
outweigh the costs of providing offensive arms.
5. involve the US Navy and US Air Force in arms transfer
negotiations with the PRC as they are the US military
arms with the greatest need for access to Chinee
bases .
5. integrate arms transfers into a broader military
relationship.
US freedom of action may, however, be limited by the
constraints previously cited in the discussion of enhancing
collective security. If the US wants to transfer arms to
China to gain access to PRC military facilities, then given
current constraints, the US can be expected to:
1. ask China for basing, calling, and/or navigational
rights in return for transferred arms.
2. help the PRC finance its arms purchases by offering
FMS credits.
3. transfer selected state-of-the-art weapons if
requested by the PRC.
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4. transfer selected offensive weapons if required to
secure desired access to PRC facilities.
5. heavily involve the US Navy and US Air Force in arms
transfers to the PRC.
6. integrate arms transfers into a broader military
relationship.
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. requested an official Naval ship visit to the port of
Shanghai which reflects a desire to secure calling and
navigational rights. Although the previously
scheduled visit was postponed, a future visit is being
discussed .[ Ref . 22]
2. not offered FHS credits.
3. not offered the PRC state-of-the-art weapons currently
in the US inventory, with the exception of the Phalanx
ship defense system. [Ref 4:p. 23]
4. not offered the PRC offensive weapons . [ R-ef 4:p. 23]
5. heavily involved the US Navy and the US Air Force in
arms transfers to the PRC as reflected by their
participation in negotiations over the anti-submarine





5. attempted to integrate the arms transfers into a
broader military relationship as noted by former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Vessey's, who remarked that, "training and tactics
were as important as technology in the military
contacts between the United States and China. "[Ref.
56]
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to gain
access to PRC military facilities, then the following
actions require further explanation:
1. the failure to offer FMS credit.
2. the extremely limited consideration given to the
transfer of state-of-the-art weapons.
3. the failure to offer the transfer of offensive
weapons
.
The difference between the expected and observed of
the US may:
1. in the case of not offering FMS credits, be due to
fiscal constraints. However, a number of countries to
include Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea
have been programmed to FMS credits during the next
fiscal year which indicates that credit is still
available .
2. in the case of not transferring state-of-the-art
weapons, be due to a variety of concerns related to
technology transfer. Those concerns might include:
a. either the intentional or unintentional
retransfer of the technology to third parties.
b. the future potential of having those weapons
turned against American forces.
c. creating a future arms sales competitor.
4. in the case of not considering the transfer of
offensive weapons, be due to fears of eliciting a
damaging reaction from the USSR, other PRC neighbors,
or American supporters of Taiwan. However, offensive
weaponry has been transferred to other nations in
spite of similiar concerns.
Due to the uneven consistency between expected and
observed activity, there is only a moderate probability that
gaining access to PRC military facilities is a priority
motive for US arms transfers to China.
3 . Promote Equipment Commonality or Stockpile Weapons
A third general military rationale for US security
assistance mentioned in the Defense Secretary's Fy 86 report
to the Congress was that, "They also enhance our ability to
interact with other friendly forces through improved
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commonality of equipment and training, thus adding a force
multiplier to US capabilities . "[Ref. 39:p. 271] Another
supplier rationale which is related to this one is for the
supplier to transfer arms in order to build up a stockpile
for itself in the recipient's territory. These rationales
are similiar in that they both involve the transfer of
weapons and equipment which are normally used by the armed
forces of the supplier. Yet, it is highly improbable that
either of these are motives for US arms transfers to China
because, as previously discussed, few of the weapons under
consideration for transfer are state-of-the-art systems in
the US military inventory. Furthermore, neither the US nor
the PRC is considering the transfer of the massive quantity
of weapons which would be required to either use as a
stockpile or effect US-PRC equipment commonality.
Therefore, based on these critical discontunities , one can
safely conclude, without going through the complete
evaluation process, that the probability is very low that
either stockpiling weapons or developing equipment
commonalit}' is a US motive for transferring arms to China.
4
. Demonstrate Military Capability
In addition to the motives articulated by Secretary
Weinberger, there are a number of other reasons for some
nations to supply arms to others. One of these is to
demonstrate the supplier's military power. A notable
example of this rationale was the US resupply of arms to
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Israel during the Yon Kippur War in October 1973. While
there is Little doubt that this was not the sole or even the
principal motive for those particular transfers, they did
serve to demonstrate American military prowess. As the PRC
is in need of massive quantities of military armament, it
could prove to be an excellent opportunity for the United
States to once again show off its strategic projection
capabilities.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to
demonstrate its military power, then it is predicted that an
unconstrained US would:
1. transfer large quantities of weapons to the PRC.
2. transfer the arms as aid or on credit if the PRC is




conduct the transfer as a military logistics exercise
or in response to a crisis situation.
In addition to the constraints discussed under
enhancing collective security, US freedom of action may be
1 ircited by
:
1. the absence of a logical reason for the demonstration
of its ability to provide large quantities of weapons
to a distantly located' friendly nation since America:
a. does not have an alliance or a mutual security
treaty with the PRC. Thus, the US would have
little reason to engage in such a military
exercise with China.
b. has not received a request from the PRC to
perform such a demonstration due to tensions or
a crisis with one of its neighbors. If both
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parties desired to have a demonstration of this
particular American military capability, it
could easily be justified as a response to
aggressive Soviet or Vietnamese behavior along
China ' s borders
.
2. domestic fiscal constraints, as such demonstrations
are costly.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to
demonstrate its military power, then, given current
constraints, the US can be expected to:
1. propose a major air-lift or sea-lift exercise for the
delivery of the arms the PRC has ordered.
2. transfer arms to the PRC using military rather than
civilian transport.
3. transfer a large enough quantity of arms to the PRC to
stage a major exercise involving a significant amount
of America's strategic lift.
4. transfer those arms the PRC cannot pay for on credit
or as military aid.
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. not used military transport for the delivery of arms
to the PRC.
2. not planned the transfer of arms to the PRC as a
military exercise.
3. not agreed to transfer to China the quantity of arms
which "would be required to demonstrate its strategic
lift.
not offered the PRC FMS credit or the arms as aid.
The one observed action that may not be due to the
listed constraints is the absence of any plans to use the
actual delivery of US arms to China as a military
demonstration. The difference between the expected and
observed actions of the US may be because the Reagan
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administration feels there is little need for the US to use
arris transfers to China to demonstrate its strategic lift
capability to the region at this tine. The administration
may feel that military exercises currently programmed for
Asia are sufficient to demonstrate America's strategic power
projection to that region.
Due to the lack of consistency between the expected
and observed activity there is a low probability that the US
.'.•sires to transfer arms to China to demonstrate American
military power.
5 . Control Regional Conflicts
Another suggested military rationale for
contemporary arms transfers is to control regional
conflicts. Arms transfers may be used to control regional
conflicts in a number of different ways. In one instance,
conventional arms may be transferred to prevent a limited
conflict from escalating into nuclear war. In fact, it has
been alleged that this was one of America's motives for the
massive and speedy resupply of Israel during its 1973 war
with Egypt and Syria. Arms transfers can also be used to
control regional conflicts by preventing one side from
achieving a decisive victor)7 over another. In this case,
the arms would be used to prevent an undesired end to a
conflict .
From a review of the ongoing debate it is apparent
that both aspects of this rationale have been used to
71
support US arms transfers to China. Regarding the control
of nuclear warfare, Robert Sutter noted that "a greater
Chinese sense of security is said to be necessary before the
United States can expect the PRC to join in serious
discussions on limiting nuclear arms development ."[ Ref
.
10:p. 28] Thus, the US may wish to transfer conventional
arms to China to prevent any potential Sino-Soviet conflict
from escalating to nuclear weapons. From the analysis of
Chinese motives for seeking US weapons, one should recall
that the PRC probably has little fear of a Soviet attack any
time in the near future. Additionally, there has been no
evidence to date that the Reagan administration arms
transfer policy for China has been driven by a desire to get
the PRC involved in the nuclear arms control process. It is
also doubtful that any US policymaker, 'without knowing
exactly where China's present nuclear threshold is, would
know what to offer the Chinese in the way of conventional
weapons to raise that threshold. Therefore, without an
expected behavior as a baseline, it is impossible to
determine if US arms transfers to China are designed to
prevent a regional conflict involving the PRC from going
nuclear
.
In the case of transferring arms to prevent the
undesired end to a regional conflict, there may be
connection with US arms transfers to China. This would be
to use China as a conduit for indirectly transferring
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American arms to people resisting Soviet or Soviet proxy
aggression, such as Afghani or Kampuchean freedom fighters.
While there have, as yet, been no indications that this is a
US motive, there is substantial evidence that China does
have the capability to get arms to the Afghani and
Kampuchean resistance. Furthermore, America has been known
"in the past to transfer its arms through third parties.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to prevent
the defeat of the Afghani or Kampuchean resistance, then it
is predicted that an unconstrained US -would:
1. transfer weapons and equipment rather than
technology since the Afghani and Kampuchean
resistance fighters need end items rather than
production capability.
2. transfer weapons and equipment quickly and in
very large quantities. This is due to the
immediacy of the threat.
3. transfer weapons and equipment supportive of the
Afghani and Kampuchean insurgencies rather than
weapons which would be used in a more
convention-:-. 1 conflict. This would place an
emphasis on the transfer of simple to operate,
lightweight, and portable weapons systems.
4. transfer weapons and equipment as military aid.
This is because the ultimate recipients would not
be expected to be able to pay for them.
5. authorize the Chinese to retransfer their
.'.merican supplied weapons and equipment to
Afghani and Kampuchean resistance fighters.
However, in addition to the constraints listed in
the discussion of enhancing mutual security, US freedom of
action may be limited by:
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1. China's unwillingness to serve as a conduit for
US anas transfers to Afghanistan or Kampuches
.
2. domestic resistance to the covert nature of this
arms transfer as evidenced by some Congressional
reluctance toward approving funds for such covert
operations .
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to prevent
the defeat of the Afghani or Kampuchean resistance, then,
given current constraints, the US can be expected to:
1. transfer weapons and equipment instead of
technology
.
2. avoid lengthy negotiations and transfer the
weapons and equipment as quickly as possible.
3. transfer mostly easily operated man portable
weapons systems which would be useful to
insurgents .
-:
. transfer the weapons and equipment as aid.
5. authorize the Chinese to retransfer the weapons
and equipment to Afghani and Kampuchean
resistance fighters.
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. ngrecd to transfer hotah weapons systems and
technology
2. been involved in lengthy negotiations over the
arms transfers.
3. to date, formally notified the Congress of only
three transfers (Sikorsky transport helicopters,
artillery munitions fuzes and plant, and F-8
avionics upgrade) which involve equipment of
little immediate use to insurgents.
4. not transfered the weapons as aid.
5. not authorized the Chinese retransfer of US
systems .
None of the actions taken by the US are consistent
with the expected behavior. The difference between the
expected and observed activity may be due to either the
PRC's unwillingness to act as a weapons conduit or the fact
that this is not a US rationale for the transfers. If
preventing the defeat of the Afghani or Kampuchean
resistance were a strong US motive for transferring weapons
to the PRC, then the US could be expected to overcome all of
the listed constraints except Chinese unwillingness to
cooperate in the activity. Furthermore, the variance in a
number of US actions which are not constrained by China's
attitudes indicates that the tested rationale is not a valid
one .
Because the US has taken no actions consistent with
a desire to prevent the defeat of the Afghani or Kampuchean
resistance, the probability that this is a priority US
rationale is extremely low.
B. POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR SUPPLYING ARMS
In the absence of a clearly defined threat, the
rationale for one country supplying weapons to another is
more often political than military. Pierre addressed this
point when he noted that since arms are often an important
symbol of support and friendly relations, they create
influence. He further pointed out that "Arguments for the
sale of weapons to China have been based not so much on the
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need to enhance its military capabilities against the Soviet
Union... as to demonstrate American friendship and further
normalize rela t ions
.
[ Ref . 3:p. 13]
Although using arms transfers for political influence
often carries a negative connotation to the recipient, this
motivation is not necessarily a bad one. The exercise of
positive influence between friends may be mutually rewarding
and satisfying. Furthermore, whether or not the influence
is intended, it may be exercised. As the executive director
of the Washington State Chinese Relations Council observed,
"Every Sino-American business transaction is a cultural
transaction as well. "[Ref. 57] Additionally, it may be
indirect influence rather than direct political leverage
that the United States gains from its arms transfers to
China. James Stoll, a former US assistant Kaval Attache to
the PRC, noted that "the greatest area of potential
influence may be in person-to-person contacts between
Americans and Chinese as the Chinese observe and adapt US
methods of production, management, and leadership. "[ Ref . 31]
It should, therefore, be apparent that gaining influence
could be a very important motive for US arms transfers to
China
.
1 . Symbolism And Friendship
The US does not have a mutual defense treaty with
the PRC and it has been repeatedly pointed out by both
Chinese and American officials that neither the United
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States nor China is seeking a military alliance. Meeting
treaty commitments can, therefore, be discounted as a US
political motive for transferring arms to China. Yet, even
though the US and China are not allies, it has been pointed
out that.
Today .. .Americans regard China as a friendly country with
which we enjoy a normal diplomatic relationship, a
productive dialogue on a number of political issues, an
expanding trade and cooperative
-arrangements oven in the
field of defense. [Ref. 42]
In fact, defense cooperation, particularly the sale
cf weapons, has often been used by the US as a means of
demonstrating its support for a country. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
Proponents of arms sales assert that "US military transfers
would serve to consolidate ties with what is viewed as the
emerging great power in Asia— China . "[Ref . 10:p. 27]
Furthermore, Pierre notes that in the area of arms sales
symbolism has been important to the Chinese and they would
prefer US arms because of what this would say about an
2g ] c-
be so symbolically significant, it is important to know if
the Reagan administration is purposefully using them to
demonstrate US friendship toward the PRC.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to
demonstrate its friendship toward the PRC, then it is
predicted that an unconstrained US would:
1. emphasize that the arms transfers are an act of





2. maintain arms transfer negotiations in spite of
perceived unfriendly PRC acts such as foreign policy
disagreements
.
3. treat the PRC as a friendly non-allied country in arms
and technology transfers.
A. provide financial terms equivalent to those given
other friendly non-allied countries.
5. integrate arms transfers into a borader overall
rela tionship.
US freedom of action may be limited by the
constraints discussed under enhancing collective security.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to demonstrate its
friendship toward the PRC, then given current constraints,
the US can be expected to:
1
.
emphasize the arms transfers as an act of friendship
"which are not directed against third parties.
2. maintain arms transfer negotiations in spite of
perceived minor unfriendly PRC actions.
3. treat the PRC as a friendly non-allied country in arms
and technology transfers.
4. provide financial terms equivalent to those given most
other friendly non-allied nations.
5. attempt to integrate arms transfers into a broader
overall relationship.
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. emphasized the arms transfers as being a part of the
normal military relations between two friendly
nations. This point was made early in President
Reagan's first term by Assistant Secretary of State
Holdridge when he stated that "our starting point was
the premise that China is not our adversary but a
friendly developing country with which, without being
allied with us, we share important strategic
interests. "[Ref. 58]
1 o
2. maintained arris transfer negotiations on items such as
the F-3 avionics package in spite of perceived minor
unfriendly acts by the PRC such as its criticism of
the US confrontation with Libya in the Gulf of Sidra.
3. recently moved the PRC into the category of friendly
non-aligned countries on the US commodity control list
and made China eligible for arms transfers through the
Foreign Military Sales program.
4. not provided FMS credits. This is in contrast to US
treatment of other friendly non-allied Asian countries
such as Thailand and Pakistan.
5. been attempting to integrate arms transfers into a
broader overall relationship.
The one observed action that does not appear to be
cue to the listed constraints is the failure to offer the
PRC F:;S credits. The failure of the US to offer the PRC FMS
credits may be due to the fact that the China is not
considered a "front line" state currently confronted with
Soviet or Soviet sponsored aggression as is the case for
Thailand and Pakistan. China would not, therefore, be a
priority recipient of FMS credits. Thus, the offer of FMS
credits may have been withheld becuse of a combination of
. 2 lack of priority and previously mentioned constraints
such as the "Taiwan lobby" or resource limitations.
Eased on the strong correlation between the expected
and observed US actions, we may conclude that it is highly
probable that the desire to demonstrate its friendship




2 . Cain Political Influence
According to Pierre, "the most important political
benefit of arms transfers may be leverage over other
countries' sensitive foreign policy decisions ."[ Ref . 4:p.
15] Regarding the exercise of potential influence and
leverage over the PRC, it has been argued that involving
China in extensive economic and military relations with the
West could provide a leavening infuence which would not only
deter a Sino-Soviet rapprochement but also inhibit future
Chinese leaders from taking actions which might be
considered threatening. Furthermore, it has been asserted
that supporting China's modernization could reduce the PRC '
s
interest in and potential for-external adventurism .[ Ref . 59]
However, as Professor Robert Scalapino has noted "these
arguments while persuasive are not conclusive ."[ Ref . 59]
The debate over using arms transfers to gain a
measure of influence over China has not been restricte to
purely academic circles. One Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) analyst stated that with its arms transfers "the US
feels it can exert some influence over China in areas of
common interest . "[Ref . 60] Another interviewed DoD official
holds that "historically, the use of arms transfers for
political leverage has never been a success ." [Ref . 61]
The problem of using arms transfers for influence or
leverage is further complicated because there are numerous
levels and types of both influence and leverage. The next
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evaluation will deal with only that influence most often
offered as a justification for transferring arms to China.
3. Keep The PRC From Tilting Each Toward the Soviet
Union
One political rationale offered in support of
transferring US arms to China is that American military
supplies would increase China's sense of security. This
would tend to reduce the USSR's ability to intimidate the
PRC and pressure Beijing into a more pro-Soviet stance. [Ref.
10:p. 23] It has also been asserted that US sales might
prevent the return of the Soviet Union as China's primary
weapons supplier. It can be argued that allowing the
Chinese to receive American weapons and technology decreases
their reliance on Soviet and Soviet type equipment .[ Ref . 62]
This, in turn, would tend to strengthen Sino-American ties
while simultaneously weakening Sino-Soviet ties.
Conversely, the denial of US weapons transfers could force
the Chinese to turn back to the Soviet camp for their
.neurit; needs.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to to keep
the PRC from tilting back toward the Soviet Union, then it
is predicted that an unconstrained US would
:
1. emphasize the purpose of the arms transfers as being
to counter a common Sino-American threat from Soviet
expansionism.
2. halt all arms transfers to the PRC at any sign of a
Chinese tilt back toward the Soviet Union.
3. offer enough of a variety and quantity of US weapons
to allow the PRC to replace their Soviet designed
armament
.
4. integrate arms transfers into a broader an ti -Soviet
military relationship in order to get the Chinese to
abandon any Soviet doctrine, tactics and training they
may use.
5. offer to transfer arms production technology as well
as end items to provide the Chinese the capability to
manufacture US designed arms to replace their Soviet
style weapons.
6. offer US arms as aid or offer FMS credits.
US freedom of action may be limited by the
constraints listed in the discussion of collective security.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to keep the PRC
from tilting back toward the Soviet Union, then given
current constraints, the US can be expected to:
1. emphasize the purpose of the arms transfers as being
to counter the threat of Soviet expansion in Asia.
2. link US-PRC arms transfer activity to the state of
Sino-Soviet relations.
2. offer the PRC the variety and quantity of arms
necessary for the Chinese to replace their Soviet
designed armament.
4. attempt to integrate arms transfers into a broader
anti-Soviet military relationship.
5. offer to transfer production technology as well as end
items.
6. offer to assist the financing of PRC arms pruchases
with FMS credit.
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. in not only arms transfers but also in discussions of
general Sino-American relations, emphasized the Soviet
threat. [Ref. 20:p. 19]
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2. recently announced "that the PRC's setting up of a
joint scientific and technological commission with the
Soviet Union... could complicate US technology
transfers to China. [Ref. 29:p. 17]
3. agreed to cooperate with the PRC in four broad
military mission areas as opposed to merely
identifying a limited number of weapons for the PRC to
buy. [Ref. 43] This could eventually get the Chinese
to consider replacing a substantial amount of their
Soviet designed, anti-tank, artillery, air defense and
surface ship anti-submarine warfare equipment.
4. attempted to integrate arms transfers into a broader
military relationship.
5. offered weapons production technology as well as end
items as evidenced by the artillery munitions deal.
5. net offered FMS credit.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to keep
the PRC from tilting back toward the Soviet Union, then the
following actions require further explanation:
1. the US failure to convince the PRC to replace its
Soviet designed equipment with US weapons
2. the failure to offer FMS credit.
The difference between the expected and observed
actions of the US may in the first case, be due to the fact
that the PRC has too much invested in its armament industry
/which is based on Soviet designed weapons. A changeover to
US ;:eapons, even with transferred US manufacturing
technology could be cost prohibitive. In the case of the
failure to offer FMS credit, be due to American domestic
fiscal and political constraints or the PRC's failure to
meet other US criteria to receive the credit.
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The relatively strong consistency between the
expected and observed US arms transfer actions in this case
indicate that there is a high probability that the US
desires to transfer arms to the PRC to Reep China from
tilting back toward the USSR.
4 . Influence Internal Chinese Poli tics
Another political reason for arms transfers would be
for the US to use them to influence internal Chinese
politics. Robert Sutter reported that
The transfers would show American "good faith," build
support for and establish American influence with the
relatively pragmatic leaders currently governing China and
promote important channels of communication with segments
of the Chinese military leadership who might otherwise
remain skeptical of China's recent tilt toward the United
States. [Ref. 10:pp. 31-32]
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to gain
access to PRC elites and provide support to pragmatic
leaders, then it is predicted that an unconstrained US
would:
1. offer a wide variety of weapons in order to gain broad
access to PRC elites.
2. set up a Security Assistance Office (SAO) such as a
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in China to
handle arms transfers which would increase the US
presence there.
3. use arms transfers as positive reinforcement for





offer the arms as aid.
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In addition to the constraints discussed under
enhancing collective security, US freedom of action may be
limited by:
1. the inability to identify the political orientations
and arms transfers objectives of various PRC leaders.
2. strong PRC resentment against any outside power
meddling in its internal political af fairs .[ Ref . 21]
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to «ain
access to PRC elites and support pragmatic leaders, then
given current constraints, the US can be expected to:
1. offer a wide variety of US weapons.
2. attempt to establish a SAO/MAAG to handle arms
transfers to China.
3. attempt to meet the arms transfer needs of the
identified pragmatic leaders.
4. offer to aid the PRC's purchase of arms with FMS
credits .
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. relative to the US arms inventory, offered only a few
types of weapons to the Chinese even though it had
agreed to cooperate with the PRC in four broad mission
areas.
2. tc date, not set up a SAO/MAAG in China.
3. has shown no indication of the use of arms transfers
in support of any particular Chinese leaders or
factions .
4. not offered FMS credits.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to gain
access to PRC elites and support pragmatic leaders, then the
following behavior requires further explanation:
1. the relatively few types of US weapons that have been
offered
.
2. the absence of a SAO/MAAG in China.
3. the failure to offer FMS credits.
The difference between the expected and observed of
the US may be due to a PRC reluctance to negotiate over more
weapons or to consider the establishment of a US MAAG in
China. Explanations for the failure of the US to offer FtlS
credits has already been discussed. Due to the relative
inconsistency between observed and expected behavior, there
is a low probability that the US desires to transfer arms to
China to gain access to PRC elites and support pragmatic
leaders .
5 . Exert Leverage Over China's Neighbors
A final political motive for supplying arms to China
could be to use the Sino-American arms connection to exert
leverage over China's Asian neighbors rather than the PRC
itself. For example, arms transfers could support a
political-military connection with Beijing which would
provide Washington additional leverage in its dealings with
Moscow. Proponents of this rationale hold that arms sales
to China can be used as a bargaining chip to gain
concessions from the Soviet Union.
Additionally, there are some who propose that arms
transfers to the PRC could be used to pressure the Japanese
into taking a more active regional defense role against the
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USSR. It is their belief that the Japanese would prefer to
accept a greater regional defense burden than see China
increase its military capabilities with US weapons. While
these motives are plausible, they are also extremely
difficult to evaluate. This is because the expected
behavior in this case would be for the US to link its arms
transfers to China with the actions of the Soviet Union,
Japan or another of China's neighbors. To date, there has
been no evidence of such a linkage and even if it existed,
it is very doubtful that it would be in the public domain.
Thus, due to unavailability of observable activity, no
judgement can be rendered regarding this rationale.
C. ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR SUPPLYING ARMS
It is sometimes assumed that the profit that American
companies would stand to make from arms sales to the Chinese
was not a major consideration in the US policy decision to
transfer arms to the PRC. However, there is substantial
evidence that si2nificant consideration was given to the
economic aspects of the developing Sino-American
relationship, to include the' economic impact of arms sales.
During Congressional hearings on "The New Era in East Asia,"
Lionel Olner, Department of Commerce Under Secretary for
International Trade, acknowledged the agreement that exists
between the Reagan administration and the American business
community regarding active US participation in China's
S7
modernization. [Ref. 63] Furthermore, Henry Kenny noted that
Sino-American mutual economic interests would eventually
link China to the United States through long-term trade,
investment, technology transfer and developmental
assistance. [Ref. 56]
Moreover, by 1984 China had become America's twentieth
largest trading partner and the United States moved up to
third among China's trading partners .[ Ref . 64] Overall
US-PRC trade for the year 1935 was around six billion
dollars .[ Ref . 65] Thus, while arms transfers policy
decisions are not normally based on profit, US arms sales to
China, as trade transactions, do support economic as well as
political-military objectives.
In the eyes of American businessmen, the Reagan
Administration decision to increase the types of arms and
related technologies which are releasable to China carries
with it substantial trade opportunity. Michael K. Hull,
director of international business for United
Technologies/Sikorsky Aircraft noted,
with regard to continuing sales in the PRC, the increase
in types of arms approved by the U.S. Government for
export to China would have' a favorable impact on our
company. For example, the Chinese have publicly stated
they desire U.S. made anti-armor missiles. Our H-76B
helicopter serves as a weapons' platform for - among
others - the TOW missile. A logical and reasonable
extension of TOU missile sales to the PRC (from ground
launchers) is the helicopter
.
[Ref . 13]
The increase in arms transfers may also positively affect
U.S. defense manufacturers who were already allowed to sell
their products in China. For example, Perry Smith, director
of China Programs for AM General pointed out that:
The more U.S. industry or the Government is successful in
building increased arms transfer to China, the better we
see the business environment. Increased use of U.S.
equipment has a multiplier effect on support equipment -
such as trucks. [Ref. 66]
Additionally it has long been recognized that allowing US
defense industries to expand their markets benefits not only
the individual companies involved but also the nation as a
whole. This is because of the importance of international
trade to a strong US defense industrial base[Ref. 67] which
recently has shown signs of deterioration
.
[Ref . 63]
There are also indications that with regard to military
and militarily related technology, the PRC prefers to do
business with the United States. [Ref. 69 and Ref. 70] This
preference on the part of the Chinese, together with the
recent US policy decision to sell the PRC arms, has provided
American defense contractors with an outstanding opportunity
to enter the China market. In fact, it appears that the
i^ehnology factor was an instrumental one in the development
of current US-China trade policy. This is reflected by
Assistant Secretary of State" Iloldridge who testified before
Congress that the US export control policy toward China is
designed to strengthen America's economic involvement in
China's modernization. He further stated that the
administration wants to help US companies employ their edge
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in technology to gain greater opportunities in the China
market. [Ref. 59: p. 343]
From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that one
should not underestimate the economic motivation behind US
arms transfers to China. However, in order to determine the
true impact of economic motives on the Reagan
administration's arms transfer policy, it is first necessary
to determine their relative validity.
1 . Improve Balance Of Payments
During the FY 86 hearings for DoD authorizations for
appropriations, it was reported that US Security Assistance
programs contribute to US exports, provide for a more
favorable balance of payments, support growth of the Gross




If the US wants to transfer arms to China to improve
its balance of payments with the PRC, then it is predicted
that an unconstrained US would:
1. not provide the arms as aid, offer FMS credit, or
concessionary commerical financial terms.
2. attempt to sell large quantities of sophisticated and
expensive weapons . This would allow the US to take
advantage of:
a. a perceived Chinese predisposition to purchase
American high technology weaponry.
a. economies of scale and decrease unit costs of
production.
3. would not allow offsets (e.g. use barter trade,
co-production, or licnesed production to offset the
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lack of hard currency) as payment for the weapons
transferred by American defense manufacturers. The
acceptance of offsets would tend to negate any balance
of payments benefits to be derived from the sale of
the arms.
4. would not allow any technology transfer which would
upgrade the PRC arms industry thereby making it a
potential arms sales competitor. This would represent
a long-term threat to the US balance of payments as
its arms exports could decline in the face of PRC
competition.
However, in addition to the constraints previously
discussed under enhancing collective security, US freedom of
action may be limited by:
1. its lack of market control due to international
competition. The US must remember that it does not
have a nonopoly on technology
.
[Ref . 31] Therefore, US
companies must be willing to make concessions to the
PRC such as accepting offsets for arms transfers if
they hope to make any arms sales at all.
2. competition among US arms manufacturers which could
result in domestic political pressures being applied
on US policymakers to make concessions in order to
close arms sales.
3. its free market system which limits governmental
influence in the American arms sales market.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to improve
its balance of payments with the PRC, then given current
constraints, the US can be expected to:
1. not offer any form of US government subsidy to help
China purchase the arms. However, the US could
encourage concessionary commerical financing as long
as the trade balance was not adversely affectd.
2. attempt to sell a large quantity of a small variety of
weapons due to limited PRC purchasing power. While
such an action would decrease the number of US
industries involved, it would allow those industries
dealing with China to benefit from economies of scale.
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3. allow US producers to accept PRC offsets for their





severely restrict the transfer of arms production
technology to prevent the PRC from becoming a future
arms sales competitor.
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. not offered the PRC any form of US government subsidy
to help with the pruchase of arms. US government
activity regarding the promotion of concessionary
commerical credit for Chinese arms purchases is
unknown
.
2. offered the PRC only a small variety of weapons.
However, to date, the US has received only small PRC
orders from among the few weapons offered.
not forbidden the use of offsets as payment for arms.
applied normal "friendly non-allied" technology
transfer restrictions to the PRC.
There was no significant variance between expected
and observed behavior. The lack of variance indicates that
improving its balance of payments with the PRC has a high
probability of being a strong US motive for transferring
arms to China
2 . Create Creater Employment
"Security Assistance programs .. .create greater
employment ."[ Ref . 71] If the US wants to transfer arms to
China to create greater employment in America, then an
unconstrained US would:
1. offer to sell China large quantities of a wide variety
of weapons to gain maximum employment benefits.
92
offer the arms as aid if the PRC is unable to purchase
then. As long as one of the two governments pays US
industry for the arms employment will be supported.
3. not allow the transfer of weapons production
technology. This is to prevent the PRC from•t=>j • * «.«.- -i-^ v_w :
a future arms sales competitor.
becoming
4. forbid American arms producers from accepting offsets,
particularly licensed production and co-production
agreements in order to prevent American jobs from
US freedom of action in this case would be limited
by the constraints previously discussed under enhancing
collective security and improving the balance of payments.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to create greater
employment in America, then given current constraints, the
US can be expected to:
1. offer to sell China a large quantity of a limited
variety of weapons. Limitations on variety will be
based on levels of technology and projected use.
2. support concessionary commercial financing for the PRC
if the US budget will not support FMS credit or arms
as aid
.
2. allow limited technology transfer and only if it is
required to keep out foreign competition.
4. restrict American arms manufacturers from accepting
offsets for payment. Allow only offsets that do not
harm US employment, such as barter trade for items
which are not produced in America.
Regarding arms transfers to China, the US has:
1. offered to sell the PRC unknown quantities of a
limited variety of weapons.
2. offered neither the arms as aid nor FMS credits.
allowed significant technology transfer in the
artillery munitions plant deal. This transfer will
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allow the PRC to develop its own capability to
manufacture US artillery munitions.
4. not forbiden US arms manufacturers from accepting
offsets as payment.
If the US wants to transfer arms to China to create
greater employment, then the following behavior requires
further explanation:
1. the transfer of technology in the artillery munitions
deal
.
2. the failure to ban offsets as payment.
The difference between the expected and observed of
the US may in both of the above cases be due to the threat
of foreign competiton. The major inconsistency between
expected and observed behavior is the US failure to insure
that American jobs would not be lost through offsets or
technology transfer. This inconsistency indicates either a
low probability that creating employment is a US motive for
transferring arms to China or that this motive has a low
priority.
D. RESULTS CF SUPPLIER RATIONALE ANALYSIS
The results of the analysis of the supplier rationale
behind America's participation in arms transfers with China
are included in Table 2. The principal results of the
analysis are:
1. The United States has multiple motives for
transferring arms to China.
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The dominant US motives for arms transfers to China
are :
a. to enhance the collective securitf American
allies and friends.
b. to prevent the PRC from tilting back toward the
USSR.
c. to improve America's balance of payments with
the PRC.
The United States is not transferring arms to China
to:
a. aid Afghani or Rampuchean resistance movements.
b. gain political leverage over China's neighbors.
c. create additional American employment
opportunities
.
It is not known if the US wishes to use arms transfers
a. raise China's nuclear threshold.
b. gain influence in China's internal politics.
The most frequent inconsistency between America's
expected and observed behavior is the US government's
failure to aid the PRC ' s arms purchases by offering
Foreign Military Sales credits. The absence of
credits could be due to a combination of factors.
First, credits are limited due to US domestic fiscal
or political constraints. Furthermore, while credits
are still being programmed for a number of foreign
countries, the PRC may not meet all US requirements
for receiving them. It appears that FMS credit is
being reserved for either those nations currently
confronted with active hostile threats or countries
which have been long standing friends of the US.
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TABLE 2
RESULTS OF SUPPLIER RATIONALE ANALYSIS
SUPPLIER COMPARED INCONSISTENT PRIORITY/
RATIONALE ACTIONS ACTIONS VALIDITY
Enhance 5 1 High
collective
security




Promote 2 2 Low
equipment
commonality
Stockpile 2 2 Low
weapons







Control 5 5 Low
conflict/
aid rebels
Demonstrate 5 1 High
US friendship
Prevent pro 6 2 Moderate
Soviet tilt







RESULTS OF SUPPLIER RATIONALE ANALYSIS
SUPPLIER COMPARED INCONSISTENT PRIORITY/







Create 4 2 Low
employment
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E. COMPARISON OF PRC AND US MOTIVES
Now that America's motives for transferring arms to the
PRC have been identified, it is possible to determine if the
Reagan arms transfer policy for China can meet both PRC and
US demands. As a test of potential demand satisfaction, the
arms transfer motives of the United States and China will be
compared to each other. This comparison is done to
determine if Chinese and American goals are complementary,
contadictory or unrelated. The presence of contradictory
goals would be an indication that either the US or China
ultimately will be dissatisfied by the arms transfer
relationship. This would imply that no US policy would be
satisfactory unless it included a modification of American
goals. Convergent goals, on the other hand, would indicate
that the relationship has a strong foundation and should be
able to overcome minor misunderstandings. Complementary
demands indicate that the relationship could be mutually
beneficial and friction would more likely be the result of
poor policy execution than its content.
The comparison of recipient demands and supplier
rationale is listed in Table 3. This comparison indicates
that there are no contradictory demands which will
automatically prevent the Reagan administation ' s arms
transfer policy from succeeding. While it might appear that
the US desire to improve its balance of payments is in
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conflict with the PRC desire to gain access to American
technology, this is not necessarily the case. There are
numerous instances in international business in which the
transfer of technology has been offered in order to gain
market access. A notable example of an US firm transferring
its technology for entry into the China market is the
1/1
McDonnel Douglas MD-82 aircraft case. The analysis
also indicates that the arms transfer relationship is based
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V. ARMS TRANSFER COSTS TO SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Like most other policies regarding American national
security, President Reagan's arms transfer policy for China
involves costs as well as benefits for the United States.
If the benefits of US arms transfers to China under the
current policy outweigh the costs, then the policy can be
considered sound. However, a comparison of actual policy
costs may not be possible since the total costs of arms
transfers are not always known at the time of their
initiation. Thus, because of their long-term impact, arms
transfers normally involve an element of risk. Yet, the
soundness of the Reagan policy can still be evaluated by
comparing its possible benefits with its risks which may be
defined as its probable costs.
The benefits that the United States wishes to attain by
selling its arms to China should be clear from the
discussion in chapter four. What remains to be determined
in this chapter are the probable costs the US may have to
bear for its arms transfer policy for China.
US arms transfers to China can be expected to affect
American relations not only with China itself but also with
China's neighbors .[ Ref . 20:p. 21] However, since the Soviet
Union is China's only neighbor which is currently likely or
powerful enough to threaten America's vital interest the
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investigation of policy costs will be focused on the
potentially negative reactions of only the PRC and the USSR.
The analaysis of adverse Chinese and Soviet reactions is
divided into two parts. The first part, which covers the
remainder of this chapter, will be an analysis of the
negative potential of arms transfers on Sino-American
bilateral relations. Part two, covered in the next chapter,
will be a discussion of the probable effects that US arms
transfers to China will have on the US-USSR-PRC strategic
triangle.
In the sale of its arms the United States is required by
law to consider not only its own costs and benefits but also
those of the recipient country. This is partly because the
Arms Export Control Act authorizes US sales to governments
which have sufficient wealth to make arms purchases without
undue burden on their economies .[ Ref . 73]
Costs associated with US arms transfers to China are not
limited to the economic arena. This point was recently made
by Ambassador William Gleysteem, when he asked a panel of
China scholars how much external military assistance China
could absorb without endangering its own economic and
political stability . [Ref . 74]
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A. MILITARY COST TO SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the US providing
its arms to the PRC is that those weapons might one day be
used against American soldiers. While there is general
agreement among US specialists that there is little
likelihood that US arms transfers would immediately affect
China's near-term power projection capabilities ,[ Ref . 10:p.
13] no such concensus on their long-range impact exists.
Additionally, events in Iran demonstrated that even in the
absence of a major military confrontation, the US could find
its interests jeapordized by the arms it transfered to a
former friend. For example, "the 'Desert One' hostage
rescue mission was complicated by th.e fact that we had given
the Iranians technology that was too sophisticated to be
countered by US systems . "[Ref . 31]
While there are no absolute guarantees that Americans
will not face Chinese in some future conflict, the near term
probability of such a clash has been judged by the current
administration to be remote. In fact, the Reagan
administration's policy review of the Sino-American
relationship was based on the' premise that China is not a US




A second potential problem with providing US weapons to
China is that through a retransfer, the US arms could end up
in the hand of America's enemies .[ Ref . 3:p. 22] For
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example, the PRC, which has been recently identified as an
arms supplier to Iran[Ref. 75], could possibly sell its US
supplied weapons to the Iranians. Since Washington has
banned all US arms transfers to Iran, it would be a logical
move for the regime in Teheran to attempt to circumvent the
US ban by securing spare parts and replacements for its
American made weapons from China if they were available.
For its part, China might be motivated to sell the weapons
to Iran in order to gain badly need hard currency.
Yet, the risk of unauthorized Chinese retransfers of
American weapons may currently be considered to be minor.
This assessment is based on a number of factors. First,
prior to export authorization approval, the US will require
assurances from the PRC that it will not transfer American




9:p. 5] Secondly, China has agreed to the arms retransfer
provisions of US law. [Ref. 41:p. 201] Additionally, it can
be argued that China will be strongly motivated to abide by
the US restrictions by its own self interests. It is
doubtful that the Chinese would risk the long term benefits
they stand to gain from continued US arms and technology
transfers for short term monetary gains from unauthorized
sales. Finally, America has a number of ways of monitoring
China's compliance with end user agreements. One means is
through the reports of US intelligence agencies. Another is
through America's control of spare parts for its transferred
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equipment. The control of spare parts is particularly
useful because it gives the US both a means of tracking
unauthorized Chinese retransfers through abnormal resupply
requests and a way to discourage the retransfers by
threatening to withhold from the PRC future repair parts and
replacement items.
One other possible military cost that the US might incur
from its arms transfers to the PRC is having to face an
increased Chinese strategic nuclear capability. This is
based on the presumption that US aid to China's conventional
forces could allow the PRC to devote more attention to
developing strategic weapons .[ Ref . 10:p. 29] It can also be
argued that technological spin offs from arms-related
technology transfers might contribute to an improved Chinese
strategic nuclear capability as well. There is, however, no
real evidence showing that resources saved from conventional
military improvements will be reallocated for the
enhancement of China's strategic forces. Moreover, the
Chinese have demonstrated a remarkable continuity in their
indigenous nuclear weapons development which was relatively
unaffected even by the turmoil and upheaval of the Cultural
Revolution and is not, therefore, expected to be
dramatically affected by US arms transfers.
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that
while the potential military costs of US arms transfers are
105
quite high the probabilities that these costs will actually
be extracted is. rather low. Thus, the militarily related
risks of the Sino-American arms connection are also low.
Furthermore, there are a number of actions which can be
taken by the United States to minimize the military risks.
One of these is to strictly limit the type, quantity and
quality of the arms to be transferred to the PRC. By
imposing such restrictions, the United States would be
limiting the potential price its own armed forces would have
to pay in the unlikely event that the transferred weapons
were used against them. The imposition and maintenance of
transfer limits, however, carry with them additional costs
which require analysis as well.
B. POLITICAL COSTS TO SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
In addressing the potential military dangers involved in
transferring US arms to China it has been repeatedly argued
that the United States has no intention of transferring
either technologically sophisticated or offensive weapons to
the PRC. However, two prominent China scholars have noted a
potential problem regarding US arms transfer intentions.
June Dreyer has called the problem the "slippery slope."
The "slippery slope" results from a feeling that because a
certain level of technology or type of weapon is approved at
one time, the next level of technology or a different type
of weapon will have to be approved later. [Ref. 76] Thus,
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early intentions to strictly limit arms transfers may be
ignored or forgotten with the passage of time. Allen
Whiting discussed the same phenomenon and attributed it to
an American tendency to try to do a little bit more than
before in order to show progress in a relationship. [ Ref . 77]
Even if relations between Washington and Beijing remain
positive and the chances of the Chinese turning their US
supplied weapons on Americans remain minimal, the escalation
of PRC weapons demands could pose a serious political
problem. This is the potential for misunderstanding and
conflict which might arise from US reluctance to accede to
rising PRC arms demands .[ Ref . 10:p. 25] Should China decide
to use its approval to receive a restricted weapons system
as a test of American friendship, then the United States
would be faced with the dilemma of having to either relax
its restrictions or fail the test. It should be noted that
this particular scenario is not an improbable one as it has
been repeatedly played out by the US with such nations as
Pakistan, Israel, Jordan, and most recently Saudi Arabia
with its desire to receive additional Stinger anti-aircraft
missiles. However, it should also be noted that the
potentially adverse Chinese reaction to such a case might
vary from a mild protest to a dramatic reversal of the
Sino-American normalization process. Yet, both the
probability and the costs of Chinese demand escalation can
be minimized by the careful American management of its arms
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transfer relationship with the PRC. If the United States is
careful about not raising China's arms expectations beyond a
point where America is willing to deliver, then the whole
problem can probably be avoided. Furthermore, if American
officials involved in arms transfers to the PRC work to
insure hat the Chinese understad how te American system
works, then Beijing is less liely to take offense at a
Washington failue to deliver a specific system.
A second major political problem of American arms
transfers to China is that US military ties might identify
the United States too closely with a group in the Chinese
leadership whose tenure may be limited and whose successors
may not be favorably disposed to the United States. [Ref.
10:p. 25] In fact, such ties might be used by opposition
factions as an issue to challenge the current leadership.
PRC opponents of Sino-American normalization could attack
the current regime in Beijing on the grounds that it was
being manipulated as a pawn in a contest between the
superpowers
.
[Ref . 76:p. 5] An example often cited which
demonstrates the extremely negative effects US arms
transfers can have on the internal political stability of a
country is that of Iran. Pierre notes that in the case of
Iran the arms transfer relationship between Teheran and
Washington came to symbolize American support for the Shah
which was strongly resented by those elements of Iranian






uecause of the inherent dangers of a political reversal
in China, one night suggest that the United States wait
until the the current leadership in Beijing has had more
time to solidify its power base, insure its succession, and
institutionalize its reforms. However, it has been pointed
out !>y Thomas Robinson that the United States nay not have
the luxury of waiting and that it "must proceed with some
rther degree of military relations with China, since it
has been Washington that has encouraged Beijing to believe
that miitary assistance would be forthcoming. "[Ref. 33:p.
12S] Furthermore, it has also been argued by the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, James [Celly, that:
d'hile there is a need for prudence against the possibility
of a different Chinese orientation in the longer term, we
must also recognize that China's future orientation will
itself be influenced by China's experiences. Excessive
caution out of fears of an unexpected change in that
orientation might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. On
t te other hand, a more forthcoming policy could enhance
Chinese perceptions of the long term value of a friendly
relationship with te '-"est, reducing the risk of eventual
confrontation. [Ref. 41: p. 195]
Uhile there is little disagreement that the return to power
in China of a radical anti-American faction would be costly
to US interests, no one can reliably predict the probability
of such an occurrence. Yet, even in the uncertainty of
China's internal political future, the United States can
take measures to minimize the risks that its arms transfers
will be a contributing factor. Among the actions
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recommended to reduce the possible negative impact of its
arms transfers, are
a. avoidance of ostentatious displays of US miliary
cooperation which are not backed by substance ,[ Ref
.
10:p. 4]
b. being attuned to the danger of re-creating within
China an elite, that because of its ties to the West,
becomes dissociated from its cultural and social ties
to the rest of Chinese society .[ Ref . 78]
c. letting defense relations mirror the slow but steady
growth of the United States-China political and
economic relations .[ Ref 41:p. 193]
C. ECONOMIC COSTS TO SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
A third area in which arms transfers can have a
significant impact on Sino-American relations is that of
economics. Some of the potential dangers for the US
associated with a Chinese economic failure include
nationwide instability which could lead to a tilting back
toward the Soviet Union or even a PRC reversion to some form
of Maoism. US involvement in the PRC'S economy could also
leave America vulnerable as a scapegoat for the failure of
"socialism with Chinese characteristics . "[Ref . 8:p. 155]
US-PRC arms deals could endanger China's economic
progress in a number of ways. An overemphasis on the
procurement of expensive US weapons systems could put the
Chinese military in direct competition with other
bureaucratic elements for relatively scarce modernization
funds and lead to serious political infighting. [Ref . 67]
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Additionally, the purchase of expensive "white
elephants", like the Rolls Royce Spey engine which could not
be adapted to the PRC ' s existing fighter aircraft, might be
used to discredit those Chinese leaders who favor a US
rientation and as an excuse for decreasing Sino-American
ties. Thus, arms transfers to China could cost the United
States and China a great deal more than just money.
Yet, one should not overstate the risks of American arms
' r-.nsfers to China's economy. In the first place, while
China's foreign reserves have been recently depleted[ Ref
.
79], the PRC continues to have a relatively small foreign
debt and has been quite conscientious in making its payments
on both interest and principal
.
[Ref . 79:p. 99] Secondly,
the Chinese have carefully guarded their hard currency
assets by patiently looking for good financing arrangement
For their overseas trade deals. [Ref. 13] Third, China's
•-.ders have repeatedly stated that military modernization
is rankeu last: among their four modernizations behind
agricultural, industrial, and scientific and technological
modernization. Lastly, the Chinese have also been careful
to select technologies which' have both civilian as well as
military applications. Thus, the probability of US arms
I .-insfers "overloading" the PRC economy is extremely low.
The principal threat to US economic interests from its
arms trade with the PRC comes from technology transfer.
This problem would not exist if the Chinese would be
satisfied with merely receiving US end products.
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Unfortunately j this is not the case. James A. Kelly
reported to Congress the Chinese, "do not consider foreign
procurement of end items to be a viable option; they want
Lbs technology with which to manufacture their own
weapons
.
[Ref . &l:p. 200] There are two major reasons for
this. One is that the Chinese feel that they were burned by
the Soviet Union in the 1950s and are therefore unwilling to
become dependent upon another country for their arms.[Ref.
20] The other is that they cannot afford to buy all the
?apons they would need to modernize their armed
Forces
.
[Ref. 81] Therefore, the Chinese can be expected to
insist that some form of technology transfer come with any
procurement of weapons from the United States.
A primary cost of technology transfer to China is the
future loss of market share. Don Bonker, chairman of the
House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
Trade recently remarked during hearings on "Controls on
F.:.-por •. s to the People's Republic of China, that the Chinese
pre interested in joint ventures in order to set up
manufacturing plants with the help of American technology.
'.'
. also noted that the Chinese plan on exporting about fifty
percent of what they produce to offset the initial cost of
the plant which makes the PRC a potential competitor in the
world market in a whole range of areas. [Ref. 82]
In the area of international arms sales, the Chinese
have already become a major force even without A.merican
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technology. Since the beginning of the 1980s, China has
jumped from tenth to fifth place among the arms exporters of
the world. [Ref. 33] In 1984, Peking is reported to have
sold around ( US ) $ 1.66 billion worth of weapons which
accounted for about seven percent of the country's total
export earnings. Today, China lags only the Soviet Union,
the United States, France and Great Eritian in total arms
sales. [Ref. 84] Currently the PRC sells armament to more
than twenty-three countries in the Third World. [Ref. 85]
In the near future, however, China is not expected to
become a major sales competitor for either the United States
or the Soviet Union. This is because the PRC does not
possess the capability to produce the high level,
sophisticated equipment made by the superpowers or other
technologically advanced countries. Yet, the lack of
sophisticated weapons has not prevented the Chinese from
penetrating some traditional American markets, the most
notable of which are Iran, Pakistan, and Thailand. In the
case of Iran it may be argued that it was the US embargo of
ar; s which allowed China to enter the market and gain sales
estimated to be worth (US)$ 1.6 billion. In Pakistan's
case, China's sale of its A-5 Fantan-A jet may be based as
much on historical political relationships as on the plane's
low cost. China's low prices, however, seem to be the main
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reason that Thailand has apparently chosen China's diesel
electric submarine over its Western competitors .[ Ref . 86]
China's chief economic advantage over its Western
competitors appears to be based on its lower labor costs.
In fact, in labor-intensive industries, China's low wage
scale is sometimes cited as being an unfair advantage. For
example, Gerald Solomon, a US congressman from New York,
dramatized this point during 1983 congressional hearings
when he said that an industry in his district and in several
othe parts of the country is on the verge of bankruptcy
because of their inability to compete with Chinese
labor. [Ref. 87] China's edge in labor can be expected to
give it some economic advantages in direct arms sales
competition with the United States. This will be
particularly true if the United States agrees to transfer
technology which will allow China to enter more
sophisticated levels of the arms market.
Since China is not expected to receive state-of-the-art
weapons systems, the United States has little to fear from
China with regards to these types of arms sales. However,
in less than state-of-the-art equipment which includes many
of the systems currently under negotiation, China might
develop the capability to become a real economic competitor.
In the Association of Southeastern Nations (ASEAN) market
alone, the United States could stand to lose over (US)$ 1
billion annually. This estimated is based on FY 87
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commercial sales, which normally involve less than
state-of-the-art equipment .[ Ref . 88]
There are a number of examples in which arms transferred
by the United States to developing countries carried with
them the technology which made the receipients arms sales
competitors. The connection between US technology transfer
and the arms production capabilities of developing nations
was recently studied by David Louscher and Michael Salomone.
They concentrated on "the transfer of less than
state-of-the-art technologies and production capabilities to
developing nations through routine security
assistance. "[ Ref . 89] One of the cases which is
particularly relevant for the China arms transfer decision
is Korea. The Republic of Korea provides an excellent
example of how China's arms industry could be developed with
US technology since the Chinese and Koreans share many
cultural characteristics and the Korean case is a relatively
recent one. Of the Korean case, Louscher and Salomone
observed that the Republic of Korea has developed a
significant military production capability primarily through
licenseand assembly agreements with the United States. ef.
89:p. 162] Furthermore, they reported that by 1980 Korea
has become a significant arms exporter with revenues
exceeding (US)$ 200 million per year. Finally they noted
that in 1982 Korean arms exports were nearly (US)$ 1
billion. [Ref . 89:p. 167]
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Based on a study of ten separate cases, the study
concluded "that the U.S. Government and U.S. corporations
are creating significant competition through security
assistance policies which in the past may not have been
attentive to the long term implications of defense
production information transfer . "[ Ref . 89:pp. 175-176]
Thus, arms transfers which provide technology to the PRC
have the potential of doing moderate damage to the US
economy by providing China the wherewithal to compete with
and possibly overtake at least a portion of the American
arms industry in the future.
There are, however, some who argue that the economic
dangers of arms related technology transfers have been
overdrawn. Supporters of arms transfers are quick to point
out that China will be expected to sign standard end-use
statements which prohibit the sale of goods provided by or
manufactured with US technology to third parties. So long
as China agrees to abide by the end-use restrictions, they
argue, the US has little to fear from its technology
transfers to the PRC. Yet, modern manufacturing has become
so complex that it is often quite difficult to determine
what technologies and technological spin-offs are the result
of transfers from an outside element or from indigenous
efforts. Additionally, the United States often has trouble
enforcing end-use rules. This is because in most cases, the
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US simply lacks the diplomatic or economic leverage to force
another country to abide by the rules. [Ref. 75:p. 39]
However, even in the absence of US-imposed sales
restrictions, the PRC will face many difficulties in
becoming a viable economic competitor with the United States
in the export of arms. One significant constraint on
China's export capability is its poor industrial
infrastructure
.
[Ref . 90] Another limiting factor is China's
shortage of technicians and managers.
From the preceding discussion, it should be apparent
that the technology transfers that can be expected to
accompany US arms transfers to the PRC pose some threat to
America's economic interest. The extent of this threat will
be dependent upon many factors including the type and level
of technology transferred, China's willingness to adhere to
end-use rules, the laws of comparative advantage, China's
overall economic modernization, and the international
political climate, among others.
America's interaction with other potential arms
suppliers to the PRC presents one final problem to be
discussed. This is the problem of coordination with
America's COCOM allies. COCOM, or the Coordinating
Committee for Export Controls, is an organization which was
founded with the purpose of controlling the export of
militarily relevant technology to Communist countries. It
was established in 1949 and its members include Japan and
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all NATO countries except Iceland and Spain. Militarily
related exports to the People's Republic of China have been
subject to COCOM review since China adopted a communist form
of government in 1949. One early concern with regard to
COCOM was the "fear that ignoring COCOM in sales to China
could weaken it resulting in fewer constraints on sales of
advanced technology to the Soviet Union. "[Ref. 91] A more
recent problem is that member nations are accusing each
other of using COCOM for commercial advantage regarding
sales to China. [Ref. 92] Disagreements within COCOM over
arms transfers to the PRC could undermine the entire
apparatus as well as create unnecessary economic friction
among allies. The loss of COCOM would have serious security
implications for East-West relations, while economic
friction could result in unnecessary economic costs
resultant to tariffs, embargos, subsidies, sanctions and
other elements of economic warfare.
The risk to COCOM of US arms transfers have, however,
recently been minimized. This was done through the careful
coordination with COCOM of changes in US export policy
regarding China. On the problem of commercial advantage,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration, William
T. Archey recently reported to the Congress that the
administration has been consulting with America's COCOM
allies on the expeditious processing of cases for China and
has gotten a positive response in nearly all cases. He also
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ir-.::r-;z the- Congress that the adninis tration has been
careful to assure the COCOM allies that the US is not
seeking a commercial advantage by attempting to move China
cases -ore rapidly. [Ref. 27:p. 10] In fact, some European
countries like Italy and France have also been pushing for
COCOM to lift the ban on a number of export items. [Ref. 93]
With regard to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
allies, Donald M. Anderson, Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
testified that America's COCOM allies did not feel that
changing China's export status was going to cause any
particular problems. He indicated that there would be no
trouble in maintaining a more restricted export policy
toward the USSR and the Warsaw Pact than toward the
PRC.^Ref. 94. Thus, with careful coordination, it appears
that the risk to COCOM of US arms transfers to the PRC can
be and have been minimized.
D. ASSESSED RISK TO SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
From the preceding analysis it has been determined that
the risk to Sino-American bilateral relations created by US
iris transfers to China is minimal. A summary of
potentially negative Chinese reactions to the transfer of
American arms is included in Table 4. While the potential
costs to US interests of an adverse Chinese reaction could
be quite high, the probability of such a damaging PRC
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reaction is in most instances low. Moreover, in those cases
in which the risk of an adverse reaction is not normally
low, the US may take precautionary measures to reduce its
risk. Thus, one can conclude that as long as the Reagan
administation has a plan for risk minimization, its arms
transfer policy for China should do little harm to
Sino-American bilateral relations. If the United States and
China were the only countries affected by the arms
transfers, then one could conclude that the benefits
outweigh the risks and the Reagan arms transfer policy for
China is a sound one. However, because US arms transfers to
China have the potential of affecting a number of nations in
Asia the aforementioned conclusion is a little premature.
Before a final judgement on the soundness of the policy can
be passed, its benefits and risks for US relations with
China's most powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union must also














































"'''Probability of occurrence can be lessened by
precautionary US actions.
**China is expected to compete in sales of less than
state-of-the-art equipment.
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VI. EFFECTS ON THE US-USSR-PRC STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
In examining the issue of US arms transfers to the PRC,
< ne of the most significant questions which must be
addressed is the reaction of the Soviet Union. In 1980,
Raymond Garthoff stated that since the Soviet Union is the
"nly power in the world presently capable of posing a vital
Lhreat to the United States, Americans should give special
importance to any situation which could affect our security
Interests in the adversary relationship which exists between
' he US and the USSR. He further stated that there is a fine
1 i between developments in Sino-American ties which serve
to deter adverse Soviet actions and those which provoke
them.[Ref. 95]
Thus, a miscalculation in Washington regarding
Moscow's reaction could be quite dangerous. In the extreme
case, the US decision to sell weapons to the PRC could lead
to a major Soviet confrontation with either the United
States or China.
A. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS
Soviet concerns with US arms sales to China have their
foundation i n the genera] Soviet perception of China as a
threat to the USSR. Writing in the Journal of Strategic
Studies
,
Gerald Segal noted that in both geographical and
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historical terms the Soviet problems in the Far East are
severe. Tin's is because in the Far East the Soviet Union
has to contend with vast open territory, few safe logistic
links, and virtually no buffer states. Furthermore, its
troops face a China with a large population, irredentist
claims and a recent tendency to tilt toward the United
Slates. [Ref. 96]
Soviet fears of an armed conflict with China were to a
limited extent realized during their 1969 border clashes.
Although fighting along the border was quickly contained,
Moscow redoubled its efforts in building up its military
for -s in the Far East, and the number of divisions along
the Chinese border increased from its pre-1969 level of
aboi '- nineteen divisions to a strength of over fifty
divisions by the early 19S0s. Since attaining this strength
level, Soviet force improvements have been qualitative
- i her than quantative and appear to be part of an overall
r
crce modernization rather than in response to increased
Chinese capabilities. However, Moscow lias never been
complacent about the "Chinese threat" and has become
increasingly alarmed by the prospects of a US-PRC arms
c-mnection. As Paul Langer points out, since the Chinese
opening to the United States, Moscow has feared that
American weapons systems and technology might transform a
potential Chinese threat to Soviet security into an
•i. tuality. [Ref . 45:p. 265]
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Current Soviet perceptions regarding US arms sales to
China may be determined from a survey of their media. The
Soviet press has carefully followed the development of
Si no-American military ties and was quick to report the
Ashing ton Post announcement of the pending artillery
munitions deal.[Ref. 97] In a recent article, I. Alexeyev
and F. Nikoleyev imply that the Soviets believe that the
US-China relationship is being built on an anti-Soviet
basis. This belief is reflected in the following passage
from their article:
To keep China to its pro-Western stand, the White House
claims that the two countries' "strategic interests" are
:'centical or close, it has lifted some of the restrictions
on trade and economic ties with China by listing it as a
"friendly state" and is involving it in military
cooperation by offering American arms. It is significant
that Washington is doing all this against the background
of extreme hostility against the Soviet Union. [Ref. 98]
An Izvestiya commentary on former Chairman of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey's 1985 trip to
Beijing said, "It is striking that both the US and Chinese
press are trying to justify the buildup of US-PRC military
cooperation with far-fetched allegations about a Soviet
Military threat . "[Ref . 99] From these and other
commentaries on the subject of Sino-American military ties,
it should be apparent that the Soviet Union takes a dim view
of US arms transfers to China.
The Soviet Union has issued explicit warnings not only
to th<- United States but also to its Western allies against
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selling arms to China. [Ref. 100] In early 1978, when China
was just beginning to look abroad for modern weapons, the
Washington Post reported "The Soviet Union cautioned the
West... against supplying weapons to China. "[Ref. 101] More
recently, the 7 June 1984 edition of the New York Times
,
carried an article detailing remarks by Yuri Dergachev, a
coRiirientator of the Soviet's Novosti press agency. Dergachev
is reported to have said that the Soviet Union would not
only lave to respond to any military cooperation between the
United states and China but that it would also retaliate if
it saw its security or that of its allies in greater
danger
.
[ Ref . 32
]
Finally, Soviet concerns with possible US-China military
cooperation were also manifested in their recent dealings
with the PRC. This was reported by Donald Zagoria who noted
that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had raised the issue of
growing Chinese-American military cooperation with China's
Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian during a 1984 U.N General
Assembly meeting. [ Ref . 101]
Given that the USSR perceives US arms transfers to the
?aC. to be a threat to its security, it would be logical to
expect the Soviet Union to initiate actions to counter them.
The USSR's responses to the developing US-PRC arms
connection will most likely be in consonance with the
overall Soviet strategic objectives for Asia. These
objectives, which are to increase its own regional
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influence, counter the influence that the US currently
enjoys in Asia, and contain the expansion of the PRC '
s
influence there, are threatened by US arms transfers to
China. They may never be attained if the Chinese are
allowed to modernize their Armed Forces with American
support
.
The Soviet Union has at its disposal all of the
international relations tools of a modern nation state.
These include but are not limited to political, economic and
military activity.
B. POLITICAL STRATEGIES
While perceptions influence the development of strategy,
it is capability which, when combined with motivation,
transforms strategic thought into action. Soviet political
activity to counter US arms transfers to China will probably
be focused on weakening the US-PRC relationship. The
Soviets will attempt to apply both direct and indirect
political pressure on each party.
1 . Link Transfers To US-USSR Relations
In order to reverse the American decision to supply
arms to the Chinese, the Soviets can be expected to link US
arms transfers to China to the state of US-USSR bilateral
relations. Moscow may threaten to torpedo the ongoing
negotiations on Strategic Arms Reductions (START),
Intermediate/Theater Nuclear Force (INF) Reductions, and/or
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Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in
Europe if the US continues to develop a military
relationship with China. The Kremlin hinted at this
strategy in 1978 when it gave its warning against Western
arms sales to Beijing. This strategy was further
acknowledged by Malcom Toon. During his 1980 Congressional
testimony Ambassador Toon said, that if the Soviets are
convinced that the United States is entertaining the idea of"
a serious arms supply relationship with the Chinese, it
would be difficult to contemplate any sort of continuation
of the SALT process
.
[Ref . 103] The linkage strategy could
be particularly attractive to Soviet policy makers because
they may believe that it caused the seven year delay,
between 1978 and 1985, when America first considered and
then finally decided to sell the Chinese arms. [Ref. 9]
Although the potential costs to the United States of
a Soviet linkage strategy are very high, the probability of
its successful implementation is rather low. In the first
place, it is doubtful that the threat to the USSR of the
proposed US arms transfers to China outweighs the threat of
being beaten in a strategic arms race by the United States.
A walkout on current arms and force reduction negotiations
by the Soviets would also tend to isolate them
diplomatically and could generate a widespread anti-Soviet
backlash. Additionally, Soviet fear of the American
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) gives Washington
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additional leverage for keeping Moscow at the bargaining
table. Although the evidence is not conclusive, it appears
that Soviet concerns with SDI were instrumental in the
USSR's recent return to arms control negotiations with the
United States. It is doubtful that the Soviets would carry
out any threats to cease the ongoing bilateral negotiations
with the US just to prevent the currently proposed US arms
from reaching China.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union may be reluctant to
use a linkage strategy because of its potentially negative
effects on the Chinese. In using linkage, the Soviet Union
would run the risk of driving the United States and China
closer together rather than separating them. There is
little doubt that Beijing would take offense with any overt
Soviet interference in US-PRC bilateral affairs. This would
probably result in the end of any hopes Moscow has of a—
rapprochement with Beijing and might even motivate the
Chinese to participate in a some sort of regional security
arrangement with the Americans.
2 . Sino-Soviet Rapprochement
Regarding a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, however, the
re-establishment of harmonious relations with the Chinese
may be another way for the Soviets to break the US-PRC arms
connection. The rapprochement strategy could disrupt the
US-PRC arms trade in a number of ways. First, it would
alarm conservative US policymakers, who, fearing the
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retransfer of US weapons technology from the Chinese to the
Soviets, would make it more difficult if not altogether
impossible for China to receive US arms.[Ref. 104] Nayan
Chanda recently reported that Washington feared China's
setting up of a joint scientific and technological
commission which the Soviet Union, announced during Soviet
First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov's visit to China in
December 1984, could complicate "US technology transfer to
China. [Ref. 29:p. 17] Secondly, a decrease in tensions
between Moscow and Beijing would decrease China's motivation
for using its limited hard currency to procure expensive
foreign weapons and weapons technology. Finally, the
normalization of relations between China and the Soviet
Union could lead to a renewed military relationship. Should
this occur, the USSR could pre-empt US arms sales to China
through its own arms transfers.
The possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement may
not be a remote one. In fact, the principal Soviet
diplomatic initiative toward China has been to rebuild
relations. Beginning in the late Brezhnev years and
continuing through the present Gorbachev regime, the USSR
has made repeated overtures to the PRC. Moreover, improved
Sino-Soviet relations was a subject which was stressed
during a recent meeting of Soviet Communist Party
leaders .[ Ref . 105] It also appears that these Soviet
overtures have not gone unnoticed by the Chinese as
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A rapprochement between the PRC and the USSR has also
been aided by the moderation of their ideological
dispute .[ Ref . 96:p. 190] Wen Wei Po, a Hong Kong newspaper
which normally reflects mainlaind attitudes, reported that
"The diminishing of ideological differences and the
acknowledgement of similar social systems have without doubt-
helped in improving relations between the two sides. "[Ref.
107] A key reason that ideology is being placed in the
background by both parties is that ideology is currently
undergoing significant transformations not only in Deng's
China but also in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. However, the
resurgence of competition for the ideological leadership of
the Socialist world based on the relative success of either
evolution could thrust ideology back into the forefront of
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Despite current and projected difficulties, in the view
of some China watchers it is inevitable that the Chinese and
the Soviets will get back together. Thomas Robinson
asserts in his essay on "Sino-Soviet Competition in Asia"
that it is against the interests of both the USSR and the
PRC as well as their respective ruling communist parties to
continue the zero-sum competition that has characterized the
last twenty years. Thus, argues Robinson, it is a matter of
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time until a major improvement in Sino-Soviet ties
occurs. [Ref. 108]
From the preceeding discussion, it appears that the
Soviet Union may be able to preclude the development oC a
Sino-American military relationship and prevent the PRC from
receiving US weapons by their own re-establishment of
"-iendly relations with the Chinese. However, the actual
threat to the United States of a Sino-Soviet relationship
would be dependent upon the nature of that relationship.
The greatest threat to US interests would be another
anti-American Sino-Soviet political-military alliance
similar to the one in the 1950s. Despite the progress the
USSR has made toward restoring its relations with China, it
is still very doubtful that there could be a return to the
level of friendship which they enjoyed prior to their split.
In fact, there are a number of_ obstacles to the development
of a close political-military relationship between the
Soviet Union and China.
The People's Republic of China has consistently cited
three major obstacles to Sino-Soviet normalization. These
are :
1. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
2. Soviet aid to Vietam in Kampuchea, and
3. Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet border and in
Mongolia. [Ref. 109]
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What concerns US policy makers, however, is that in
spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has made no real
concessions on these three issues, the Chinese have
apparently decided to pursue improved relations anyway. ef.
46] For their part, the Chinese have been quick to point
out that despite recent indications of a decrease in
tensions, they "have not relented on their three
pre-conditions (the "three obstacles") for a full
normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 29:p.
17] In fact, there are some recent indications that Beijing
is beginning to take a tougher stand toward Moscow. [Ref.
110]
On the Soviet side of the dispute, there has been no
indication that Moscow is prepared to agree to any of
China's three conditions for normalization. Recent Soviet
overtures have been described by some Chinese as merely
"sidestepping the fundamental obstacles ."[ Ref . 107] Soviet
intransigence toward resolving fundamental issues with China
may be traced to a number of domestic factors. Vernon V.
Aspaturian writes that a primary reason for the lack of
resolution of Sino-Soviet problems is that there appear to
be several interest groups in the Soviet Union who benefit
more from Sino-Soviet tensions than from Sino-Soviet
detente. [Ref . Ill]
A more international constraint on Soviet actions is
that any Soviet concession to the Chinese could set a bad
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precedent in Soviet foreign relations. A Soviet withdrawal
from either its border with the PRC or from Afghanistan in
response to Chinese pressure could generate additional
political pressure for other withdrawals
.
[Ref . 112] This
constraint is particularly strong with regard to the Warsaw
Pact. The Soviets can ill afford to add territorial
challenges to the pressures they are already facing from
Pact nations such as Poland or Romania.
In addition to these contemporary issues, there are
other more fundamental problems separating the Chinese and
the Soviets. Among those are the fact that:
1. the Chinese and Soviets share the longest common
boundary in the world.
2. there is a strong ethnic element in the dispute.
3. there have been a number of serious historical
disagreements between the Russians and the
Chinese. [Ref . 113]
Even though the weight one might give these three factors
today is debatable, they are still worth noting. When the
historical frictions are combined with the more contemporary
issues, it becomes quite evident that due to the significant
number of obstacles to a true Sino-Soviet rapprochement,
there is almost no chance of one taking place. [Ref 44
:
p . 53]
Therefore, a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, due to its low
probability represents minimal risk to US interests and
should not deter US arms transfers to China.
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3 . Link Transfers To East -West Relations
In addition to their bilateral diplomatic
maneuvering with the US and the PRC, the Soviet Union may
also attempt to attack the Sino-American relationship by
using third parties to pressure both the United States and
China. One approach that the USSR might use would be to
expand the linkage strategy already discussed to include
America's NATO allies. Douglas ' Stuart noted that although
the USSR has not felt compelled to harangue Western
governments regarding their relations with China it retains
an impressive array of negative and positive instruments for
influencing Western European policy. [Ref. 114] By linking
Sino-US military relations in general and arms transfers in
particular to East-West relations, the Soviets could put the
US in the position of having to choose between NATO and the
PRC.
The Soviet Union will, however, probably be
reluctant to try influencing the United States by pressuring
its Western European allies. In addition to the arguments
against linkage which already have been made, the USSR might
also be restrained from using Western Europe as a lever
because of its own growing political and economic
interdependence with the region. Furthermore, the Soviet's
recent bad experience with using a heavy hand in trying to
prevent the European deployment of US Pershing II and Cruise
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missiles may provide still another disincentive for
involving NATO.
4. Isolate And Encircle The PRC
Although the USSR has considerable political clout
in Western Europe, this is not the case in the Far East.
While the Soviet Union is politically active in East Asia,
it is "relatively new to the region and certainly not
accepted politically as a 'natural' state. "Ref. 96:p. 185]
In its continuing competition with the PRC for regional
influence in Asia, the Soviet Union will maintain its
efforts to politically isolate China. Edward Luttwak noted
that the a goal of Soviet strategic diplomacy has been "to
enroll as many of China's neighbors as possible in a Moscow
centered alliance against the PRC."^ Ref * 115 ^
In order to get China to refuse American weapons or
at least lessen their impact, the Soviet Union may redouble
their efforts to isolate the PRC. By combining the age old
fears of Chinese expansionism held by many of China's
neighbors with the future prospect of a China armed with
modern American weapons, the USSR might be able to
strengthen their anti-Chinese alliance, which currently
includes only Indochina and partially India. In addition to
forming a military alliance, the USSR might use the issue of
the growing Chinese threat to the region together with other
diplomatic and economic initiatives to either attract
nonaligned nations like Malaysia and Indonesia or draw
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western-leaning nations like South Korea and Japan more
toward the center. Such a strategy would serve both to
lessen the impact of China's modernized armed forces and to
give the Soviets additional leverage with which to break the
Washington-Beijing connection.
Yet, the probability of success for either a Soviet
encirclement or isolation strategy to counter the developing
US-PRC military relationship cannot be considered to be very-
high. In order to effectively contain and/or isolate the
Chinese the Soviets would have to do a number of things all
of which are less than likely. First, they would have to
convince nations like Japan and South Korea that China
represented a greater threat to the peace and stability of
the region than the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they would
have to convince these and other US allies to follow a
Soviet rather than an American political lead.
Additionally, the USSR would have to persuade countries like
North Korea, India, and Indonesia that formal alignment with
the Soviet Union would be more advantageous to them than
even superficial nonalignment
.
While the Soviets may react to US arms sales to
China by stepping up their attempt to encircle the PRC, the
small chance of success for this strategy tends to diminish
its risk potential. Furthermore, encirclement which may be
threatening to China would not necessarily be detrimental to
the United States and it could actually drive the PRC closer
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to the US. The Soviets might also be inhibited from
completely encircling the PRC because of fears on the part
of some in the Kremlin of a violent and possibly irrational
Chinese reaction. Finally, there are numerous other
bilateral issues between the USSR and the Asian nations they
hope to attract which must be resolved before the Soviets
can expect a reasonable chance of successfully isolating
China
.
5 . Promote A Regional Arms Freeze
One additional Soviet diplomatic action worth noting
which could serve to limit the flow of US weapons to the PRC
would be a renewed call for talks on confidence-building
measures in the Far East. These talks, called for by the
26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, [Ref. 105:p. 24] could result in confidence building
measures similar to those negotiated for Europe during the
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
They could also include provisions for an arms freeze with
which the Soviets could grasp the diplomatic initiative and
gain widespread support for maintaining the status quo
military balance in Asia. Since American arms sales to
China are only in their initial stages, general acceptance
of the military status quo would effectively freeze the flow
of US and other weapons to China. To date, however, this
Soviet initiative has not received much support. One can
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also predict little support for this idea in the near future
based on the lack of progress with force reduction and
disarmament talks elsewhere in the world. As a final point
on this issue, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese would
allow themselves to be "frozen" into a state of military
inferiority to the Soviet Union. Segal points out that,
"Neither side is likely to engage in detente out of a sense
of weakness for 'history has taught' that peace is best
achieved through strength ."[ Ref . 96:p. 183] Since this
action also carries little chance of success, it too bears
little risk to the United States.
In retrospect, it appears that Soviet political options
are somewhat limited due to both internal and external
constraints. Political objectives may, however, be pursued
by other than purely political means. Due to the lack of
political maneuverability, the Soviets may choose to
exercise economic or military options to counter the
development of a Sino-American arms connection.
C. ECONOMIC TOOLS
Theoretically, the economic tools available to the
Soviet Union for countering US arms transfers to the PRC are
trade and economic assistance. On one hand, the USSR should
be able to use the prospect of increased trade or economic
assistance as an incentive for the US to stop supplying or
the PRC to stop receiving arms. On the negative side, the
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USSR might threaten to react to the US-China arms trace with
economic sanctions against one or both countries. In
reality, however, the USSR does not have much capability to
use economic leverage to support its political objectives.
This is because the Soviet Union is neither a major trading
partner nor a significant source of economic assistance to
the United States, China or their Pacific allies.
1 . Impose Economic Sanctions
With regard to the United States, Soviet economic
leverage is nil. For the year 1984, US exports to the USSR
amounted to only (US)$ 3.3 billion. America's exports to
the Soviet Union were less than two percent of its total
exports worldwide. Imports from the Soviet Union were ever.
smaller amounting to only ( US ) $ 500 million .[ Ref . 116]
In the case of China, the Soviets might be perceived
to have some influence because of a (US)$ 14 billion five
year trade agreement recently signed by the two countries.
Additionally, since neither country has particularly
abundant hard currency reserves, barter trade with the
Soviets might be somewhat attractive to the Chinese. Yet,
the overall impact of the recent Sino-Soviet trade agreement
remains to be seen. An early assessment by one diplomat was
that it is unlikely that the PRC will stop developing
military ties to the West until it sees some basic shifts in
the strategic stance of the USSR. [Ref. 117]
Regionally, the Soviets have not fared much better,
and it is doubtful that they could use economic leverage in
support of an encirclement strategy. In hearings before the
Senate Appropriations Committee, Admiral William J. Crowe,
then Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, testified that
economically, the Soviets are almost non-players in the
region and they have been unable to penetrate the robust
Asian markets .[ Ref . 118]
2. Offer Siberian Resources As Economic Ince nt ive
Due to its relatively low levels of trade, the USSR
has not been able to exert much economic leverage in Asia.
This could change sometime in the future because the Soviets
do have one significant group of economic incentives to
offer the nations of Asia, the natural resources of Siberia.
Asian nations like South Korea and Japan which are energy
poor may be especially susceptible to the incentive of
relatively inexpensive Siberian energy. If the USSR can
successfully exploit its Siberian resources, then it would
have the capability of becoming a major economic player in
Asia. Yet, to date the successful exploitation of Siberia's
wealth has eluded the Soviet Union. The USSR does not
currently possess the technology it needs to tap its
Siberian resources. Furthermore, due to political and
domestic bureaucratic obstacles, the USSR has been
unsuccessful in securing the cooperation of those countries
who do have the required technology. Finally, because of
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the volatility of the world energy and raw materials
markets, there are no guarantees that the successful
exploitation of Siberia could be translated into economic
leverage in Asia by the Soviet Union.
Because of the constraints on its political
influence, Soviet motivation to use economic activity to
counter US arms transfers to the PRC is probably quite
strong. However, as a result of its limited trade with the
US, the PRC and the China's Asian neighbors, its current
ability to do so is rather weak. Furthermore, even though
its Siberian resources may one day be exploited, the USSR's
current and near-term prospects for tapping those resources
are so poor that the Soviet Union's emergence as an Asian
economic power lies somewhere in the distant future. For
the present, then, the Soviet Union will have to rely on
other forms of power if it hopes to counter US arms
transfers to the PRC. A traditional aspect of Soviet power,
and one that is growing in Asia, is the topic of the next
section, which addresses military options.
D. MILITARY OPTIONS
In his essay, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," Paul F.
Langer made two important observations. First, military
power is a critical element of Soviet political strategy.
Second, the emphasis on the use of military power as an
instrument of Soviet policy is attributable to a number of
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factors including the USSR's historical experience, its
geopolitical position, the chronic weakness of the its
economy, and to the decline of its ideological appeal
abroad. [Ref.45:p. 257]
The Soviet tendency to use their military power, when
considered in light of the fact that theirs is the only
military force in the world capable of challenging that of
the United States, makes a Soviet military response to US
arms transfers to the PRC the most dangerous one to be
considered. It should be noted that the Soviet Union would
not necessarily limit its military response to China or East
Asia, but could take action elsewhere in the world to show
its general displeasure with the US decision to sell weapons
to the Chinese. However, even though Soviet military
objectives regarding this issue will probably be formulated
as part of their global strategy, this next section will
focus on Soviet Asian regional alternatives. This is
because Soviet military reactions involving countries other
than China or her immediate neighbors are beyond the scope
of this study.
Even discounting areas outside of Asia, the potential
Soviet military reactions to the US-China arms trade are
quite numerous. These include in an order of increasing
magnitude
:
1. provoke a regional arms race
2. launch a limited conventional attack on China
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3. launch a Limited nuclear strike on China
4. launch a major conventional attack on China
5. start a full scale nuclear war with China. [Ref. 95 ]
1
.
Create Regional Arms Race
US-USSR backed regional arms races have substantial
precedent, as in the cases of India and Pakistan or the
Arabs and the Israelis. i-P nbince some or wma s nei^noors
such as India and Vietnam, consider her to be a potential
threat to their security, US arms transfers, which upgrade
the military capability of the PRC, can be expected tc
trigger Indian and Vietnamese requests for additional ar.
from the Soviet Union. This in turn may trigger additional
Chinese requests for US arms. Additionally, there is a
tendency for not only the quantity but also the quality of
the weapons requested and supplied to increase.
In the case of the growing military ties between ':
United Statas and China, some Soviet officials and analysis
have already said that this has contributed to the overall
deterioration in US-USSR relations and to a greater Soviet
military buildup in the Far East. [Ref. 100:p. 110] Vladimir
Petrov notes that "In countering the danger of the emerging
United States-People's Republic of China coalition, the
Soviets increased their support of Hanoi ... "[Ref . 119]
trend of Soviet arms escalation in Asia has also shown no
signs of slowing down. Most recently, Assistant Secretary
of State Wolfowitz testified that, "The USSR
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continues to strengthen its military forces in the region
and has recently added MiG-23 fighter aircraft to its
already formidable military presence in Vietnam ."[ Ref . 120]
Thus, as the relationship between the United States and
China has grown, it is evident that Soviet military support
of its Asian allies has grown as well.
Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander in Chief,
Pacific Command, stated before a House Subcommittee that
raising the general level of military technology in a region
is usually not in the interest of the United States because
as the military technology goes up relative US strength goes
down. [Ref. 121]
There is, however, some disagreement about the true
causes of the Soviet arms buildup in Asia. There are a
number of intelligence analysts who contend that it has
little to do with US-Chinese relations, but is the result of
overall Soviet force modernization initiatives. In an arms
race it is often difficult to determine who is proactive and
who is reactive. One should note, however, that prior to
the delivery of the first US weapons system to China, the
Soviets had already taken significant actions to upgrade
their regional military capability and that of their allies.
It would be difficult to conclude, therefore, that the
projected transfer of US arms to the PRC caused a regional
arms race. Due to the difficulty of determining the
correlation between proposed US and actual Soviet arms
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transfers to East Asia, it might be ::cre worthwhile to
investigate other Soviet military reactions.
2. Attack The PRC
The four remaining Soviet military options all
involve some form of conflict with China, with the expected
cost increasing with each level of attack. However, becaus
of the problems of uncontrolled escalation, the potential
cost of any attack is high. Therefore, the four attack
options will be considered together. Although a Soviet
attack would be an extreme reaction to US arms transfers to
tie PRC, there are those who argue that it should net be
discounted. \mbassador Toon warned that,
Ue must recognize first that the Soviets are so paranoi
about China that if they felt we mere developing 2 tight
political relationship with Beijing,... with possible
military overtones and targeted on Moscow, they would be




Uhile A:.* assador Toon was speaking in terms o^ m> o, m> T" ,*m '
lino-American political and military ties, June Dreyer
addressed the prospects of Soviet military action in ii:. j .
T'c; c o~,response to Ub arms transfers. In Conmressionai tes
Dreyer stated that there is a possibility that Unite J State:
vjeapons transfers would either genuinely upset the Soviet
Union or else provide it with an excuse for aggressive
action .[ Ref . 7G:p. 5] Thus, there are experts on both the
nineso c; p ow -_i 1 1 <_ 1 - Soviets who believe that a Soviet military
reaction is a possibility. Furthermore, it is clear to US
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intelligence analysts and China watchers alike that the
Soviets have the military power to execute any of the four
attack options previously mentioned .[ Ref . 45:pp. 255-256]
There are, however, a number of other analysts who
disagree with the assessment that US arms transfers to China
would necessarily provoke an attack by the Soviet Union.
Some, like Roger Sullivan presented the converse argument
that it would be the failure tosell arms to China which
would invite Soviet aggression, because a US decision not to
sell could be an indication of timidity in developing a
normal US-PRC defense relationship. This timidity, in turn,
might tempt the Soviet Union to take aggressive actions to
exploit the suggestion of US weakness .[ Ref . 122] Others
argue that a military response by the USSR is unlikely
because of historical Soviet tendencies toward extreme
caution and risk avoidance especially when dealing with
China. [Ref. 77p:p 147]
Lastly, there is a group of analysts who base their
prediction of the likelihood of a Soviet military response
on the type of arms being transferred to China by the US and
the level of development of the Sino-American military
relationship. This group generally holds that, although the
Soviets would prefer no US-PRC military relationship, they
could live with a modest one. It is also their belief that
the Soviets would have to feel gravely threatened before
they would launch an attack on China.
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Even though the experts remain divided on the exact
probability of a Soviet military response to US arris
transfers to China, it is generally conceded that the type
of weapons ' ransfei s currently being considered and the
level of military ties being pursued by the United States
are modest enough to preclude an attack on the PRC.[Ref.
120:p. 128, Ref. 32:p. 132, and Ref 44:p. 83] Critical
aspects of the weapons currently under consideration arc
that they are small in number, primarily defensive in nature
and do not represent state of the art technology. Thus,
under current conditions the risk of a Soviet military
response to the proposed US arms sales to China can be
assessed as being slight. One could also predict no Soviet
military reaction to future US-PRC military developments as
long as their pace was reasonably slow. This risk, however,
could be expected to rapidly rise if either the quantity or
quality of the transferred arms were to dramatically change.
E. ASSESSED RISK TO THE US-USSR-PRC STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
Based on the preceeding analysis, one can conclude that
the US decision to sell arms to the PRC does not carry with
it unacceptable risks with regards to the reaction of the
Soviet Union. A review of the potential Soviet reactions is
shown in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
ASSESSED RISK TO THE
US-USSR-PRC STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
SOVIET TYPE COST/ PROBABILITY
REACTION ACTIVITY THREAT TO US IT OCCURS/
SUCCEEDS
Link transfers Political High Low
to US-USSR
relations
Sino-Soviet Political .^Ig^1 Low
Rapprochement
Link transfers Political High Low
to East-West
Relations
Isolate/ Political Low Low
Encircle PRC
Regional arms Political Low Low
freeze
Trade as Economic Low Low
incentive
Economic Economic Low Low
sanctions
Siberian Economic High Low
resources as
incentive
Regional arms Military Moderate High
race
Attack PRC Military High Low*
*It is debatable whether US arms transfers to the PRC would
increase the pace of Soviet Far Eastern force modernization
which is already taking place.
""The probability of occurrence is low only for currently
proposed level of arms transfers.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The determination of the soundness of a current foreign
policy poses a significant challenge for the student of
international relations. This is because policy
implications involve values, such as influence, leverage and
security, which are not easily quantified. Additionally,
the full ramifications of a contemporary policy will be
known only through the test of time. Yet, policies must be
evaluated if they are to have any chance of succeeding.
Policy evaluations are also useful because in addition to
supporting or refuting judgements, evaluations provide
policy makers with a great deal of valuable information.
The information derived from a policy evaluation may include
such things as the identification of data deficiencies,
potential problem areas in formulation or execution, and
opportunities for the future.
Due to the difficulty of quantifying relevant values,
policy evaluations are often subjective. Yet, qualitative
evaluations can be as valid as quantitative tests if they
are properly developed and supported. The purpose of this
work was to subjectively determine if the Reagan
administration's policy for transferring American arms to
China is sound. For the purpose of the evaluation, a sound
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which the potential benefits outweighed the assessed risks,
with the risk assessment being based on the probability and
level of policy costs. Other relevant indicators of the
policy's soundness were the absence of gross discontinuities
in the policy's historical development as well as the
absence of conflicting US and PRC motives in the
Washington-Beijing arms connection.
A. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Reagan arms transfer policy for China which was
examined in chapters two through six was subjected to a
three part evaluation. The following is a brief review of
the results of each chapter evaluation.
In chapter two, the development of the Reagan arms
transfer policy for China was traced from its roots in the
Nixon White House through the Ford and Carter
administrations to the present. The investigation of the
policy's historical background clearly indicated that the
Reagan policy represents the latest iteration of what has
been an evolutionary process. While the evolution may be
considered by some "China watchers" to have been too rapid,
there were no revolutionary actions in the development of
the Reagan administration's current position on the transfer
of American weapons to the PRC. The absence of abberant
activity in its development is a strong indication of the
fundamental soundness of the Reagan policy.
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Further indications that the Reagan arms transfer policy
for China is basically a healthy one we're discussed in
chapters three and four. In these chapters the motives of
both the United States and China for becoming involved in
arms transfers with each other were explored. The assessed
validity and/or priority of a tested rationale was based on
the comparison of the arms transfer actions either nation
could reasonably be expected to. take based on that
rationale, with their actual arms transfer behavior. High
behavioral consistence was interpreted as an indication that
the tested rationale has a high probability of being a
priority supplier or recipient rationale. Conversely, low
consistency was read as an indicator that the tested
rational had either a low priority or a low probability of
being a valid one.
The behavior comparison analysis in chapter three showed
that the PRC has multiple motives for seeking US arms.
These motives do not, however, carry equal weight and the
strongest ones were determined to be China's desire to:
1. counter the long term Soviet expansion,
2. gain some political leverage over the USSR, and
3. gain access to American technology.
Using the same methodology in chapter four, the US was
identified as also having several reasons for desiring to
transfer arms to China. American motives like those of the
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Chinese are not uniform' in their strength. The primary
US motives for selling arms to China are:
1. to enhance the collective security of itself and its
friends and allies,
2. to demonstrate its friendship to the PRC, and
3. to improve its balance of payments.
The investigation into supplier rationale also revealed
a number of tangential benefits .which the US could derive
from its arms sales to China. While these benefits may not
be substantial enough to cite as primary motivators, they
are nevertheless noteworthy as they provide additional
support to the main American rationales for supplying arms
to the PRC. Thus, in addition to the benefits mentioned
above that the US strongly desires to gain from the
Sino-American arms connection, the United States could also
use the arms transfers to:
1. gain access to PRC mililtary facilities which* could
follow arms transfers in a natural expansion of
military ties,
2. gain some leverage over the USSR to moderate its Far
Eastern expansionism by helping China transform its
potential power into real military strength,
3. demonstrate its strategic military projection
capability by staging a military air lift or sea lift
exercise for the delivery of American arms ordered by
the PRC,
4. prevent the PRC from tilting back toward the USSR for
its security needs by pre-empting a renewed USSR-PRC
arms transfer relationship,
5. gain access to more PRC leaders,
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6. gain access to additional PRC markets by getting
Chinese leaders more accustomed to and satisfied with
US products, and
7. support America's defense industrial production base
through increased arm sales.
During the investigation into recipient demand factors
and supplier rationale it was discovered that there are also
a number of unknowns regarding the US-PRC arms connection.
For instance, there is little information available on the
use of American arms by Chinese policymakers for their own
internal political support. Likewise, there is insufficient
information on the relationship between the PRC '
s
conventional and strategic force modernization programs to
make any conclusive judgements on the effect of US arms
transfers on China's strategic weapons development. Lastly,
there is not enough data available to judge how effective
the US could be in using its arms transfers to China to gain
leverage over China's neighbors.
In evaluating the effect of supplier rationales and
recipient demand factors, a comparison of both recipient and
supplier motivation revealed that there were no
contradictory objectives in the Sino-American arms transfer
relationship. Based on the absence of contradictory
motivations one could conclude that there are no major
obstacles to the development of a healthy arms transfer
relationship between the United States and China.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the relationship is based
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on the sound foundation of a common Sino-American interest
of countering Soviet expansionism. Additionally, the
presence of several complementary arms transfer objectives
indicates that there is a significant opportunity for both
the United States and China to benefit from their arms
transfer relationship.
The final policy evaluation was based on an analysis of
the risks associated with US arms transfers to China. The
analysis in chapter five indicates that there is little risk
that arms transfers will upset Sino-American normalization.
It was further pointed out that the risk of arms sales
having a negative effect on US-PRC relations can be reduced
by preventive actions on the part of the United States.
Similiarly, the discussion in chapter six showed that the
risk of a costly Soviet reaction to the transfer of American
arms to China is also low. Thus, in this final analysis,
the Reagan administration's arms transfer policy was found
to be sound since the potential benefits of that policy were
determined to outweigh the risks.
E. IMPROVING THE POLICY PROCESS
Although it has been concluded that the Reagan
administration's current arms transfer policy for China is
sound, there still appears to be room for improvement.
While conducting research for this thesis several
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potentially weak areas in policy formulation
-jr.''
implementation were discovered.
The first area of potential weakness is that of
strategic planning. Robert Sutter reported in 19S1 that a
common recommendation regarding US arms transfers to China
was for "more clear articulation and management of US policy
toward China. "[Ref. 10:p. 14] What Sutter said then appears
to remain true today. Eecau.e of the "case-by-case" nature -
of the current policy there appears to be no strategy for US
arms transfers to the PRC. The lack of a comprehensive arms
transfer strategy could quickly lead the United States down
the "slippery slope" addressed by June Dreyer. Benefits of
a clear and comprehensive strategy could include:
1. better coordination not only within the US government
but also between American government and private
agencies, (A comprehensive strategy would give all
arms transfer participants a common base to work
from . )
2. a potential reduction of interagency rivalry, (With
specific guidelines there might be less of a tendency
for those agencies involved in arms transfers, such as
the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Department of Def-nse Staff or the Army and the Navy,
to compete with each other as they have been accused
of doing in the recent past.)
3. and a reduced chance of inadvertantly raising China's
arms transfer expectations.
A second area in which improvements could be made is in
the coordination of both policy development and execution.
Current coordination of US arms transfers to the PRC appears
to be on an ad hoc basis. While it has been pointed out
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that "US responses and proposals in military technology
cooperation discussions with the Chinese have been fully
coordinated ,"[ Ref . 43] this coordination was due more to the
foresight, competence and luck of those individuals involved
than any governmental design. Furthermore, there is
currently no organization or mechanism to insure that all of
the US agencies involved in arms transfers to China work in
harmony with each other. Because of this, there appear to
have been some uncoordinated and potentially embarassing US
arms transfer activity involving some rather high level
government officials. This situation could be remedied by
the creation of a China Arms Transfer Inter-Agency Group
(CATIG) consisting of the heads of the various US Government
agencies involved in arms transfers to China. Such a group,
which could be modeled on the Inter-Agency Group that
currently exists for monitoring dual-use equipment
transfers, would be responsible for formal long range
planning, policy development and management. The CATIG could
be chaired by the National Security Council or one of the
other arms transfer players. The CATIG would logically be
supported by an Inter-Agency Working group consisting of
staff personnel of the CATIG 's member agencies which would
meet on a regular basis. Their job would be to handle the
routine management of US arms transfers to the PRC. The
principal benefits of formal coordination could include:
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1. a decrease in the over-compartnentation of
intelligence information relevant to the arris transfer
process
,
2. a reduced likelihood of one US agency being played off
against another by Chinese arms transfer negotiators,
3. increased continuity and consistency of policy between
administrations,
4. better information tasking and management to support
policy needs,
5. and a reduced likelihood that routine matters such as
COCOM coordination or the pre-briefing of official
visitors to China would be overlooked.
A final area in which the arms transfer policy process
for China might be improved is in the analysis of risks and
benefits. Currently, US arms transfers to China arc, in the
words of one administration official, driven by obvious
benefits. While the policymakers in Washington are almost
certainly aware of the costs, benefits and risks associated
with US arms transfers to the PRC, they do not appear to use
any kind of quantative model with which to compare them with
each other. This may be intentional since some analysts
like Thomas Robinson argue that, in weighing the advantages
and disadvantages of American-Chinese military tics, it is
"futile and politically erroneous to try and add them up in
some pseudo-mathematical f ashion . " [ Ref . 33:p. 134]
While it is by no means being suggested that policy
makers reduce their decisions to a series of mathematical
equations, a case can be made that quantifying values and
taking an engineering approach to policy analysis can
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support the development and management of the arms transfer
policy for China. Numerical values could be particularly
useful in assessing the potential gains and risks associated
with individual weapons transfers, because these judgements
involve not only the benefits or costs of an action but also
its probability of occurrence. Table 6 is an example of
using numerical values to weigh the potential risk of an
adverse Soviet reaction against "the likely benefit to US
interests of transferring US main battle tanks to China.
Although the Table 6 example is a simple one it does
illustrate some of the principal advantages of using a
quantative model to support policy decisions. First, the
model allows for a more direct and detailed comparison of
risk and gain since numbers convey values more precisely
than terms such as low, moderate, and high. The model also
allows for the incremental updating of valojes due to minor
changes in probability. This could alert the policy maker
to cumulative costs or benefits which might otherwise be
overlooked. Additionally, drastic changes in the
international political environment can be quickly factored
in by changing the assigned values.
The most difficult aspect of using a quantative approach
to risk/gain assessments would most likely be in assigning
numbers to the costs, benefits, and probabilities related to
various actions. Yet, while it may be difficult, it is not
impossible and a great deal of work has been done in related
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areas. For example, in indications and warning
intelligence, numerical probabilities are routinely assigned
to potentially harmful actions using advanced mathematical
techniques such as Bayesian analysis. Furthermore, the
assignment of numerical values to such abstract concepts as
deterrence and political influence has been done quite well
using computer simulations.
In spite of the improvements which can be made in the
policy process, one may still conclude that the Reagan
administration arms transfer policy for China is basically a
sound one since its potential benefits are greater than its
probable costs. The recommended changes to policy
formulation and execution which have been presented were
offered so that the US might maximize its gains and minimize
its risks in transferring arms to China.
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TABLE 6
RISK VERSUS GAIN OF
TRANSFERRING MAIN BATTLE TANKS
RISK
SOVIET COST PROBABILITY ASSESSED
ACTION TO US OF OCCURRENCE RISK
Cancel -40 .70 -28
summit
Transfer -50 .50 -25
T-64 to
N . Korea





US BENEFIT PROBABILITY ASSESSED
ACTION TO US OF SUCCESS GAIN
Secure + 70 .20 + 14
basing
rights
Secure + 20 .90 + 18
port call
rights




ASSESSMENT: GAIN = +62 IS GREATER THAN RISK = -61*
*A11 assigned values are fictional.
**A value of 1.00 would be assigned if the proposed benefit
was guaranteed by the PRC as part of the transfer.
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